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THE IMPOSITION OF FEDERAL CAPS IN MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE LIABILITY ACTIONS: WILL THEY CURE
THE CURRENT CRISIS IN HEALTH CARE?
Adam D. Glassman ∗

I. INTRODUCTION
Today in the United States we have a medical emergency on our
hands.
Many physicians1 have experienced exorbitant medical
malpractice liability insurance premium increases, oftentimes as high as
100% or even 200% over the previous year.2 Others have been
summarily discarded by their insurance carriers.3 As a result, doctors
have been left with few alternatives, including: selecting other insurers,
practicing without coverage, moving to and practicing in states with
lower medical malpractice insurance premiums than their own, or simply
giving up medicine altogether.4
While this growing epidemic must be dealt with immediately, there
has been no consensus on how to tackle the problem faced by the
medical community and, in turn, by Americans in need of reliable health
care.
Earlier this year, the American Medical Association (AMA)
declared that eighteen states are currently facing a medical insurance
crisis.5 Notwithstanding this finding, “[s]oaring premiums on medical
∗
Assistant Professor of Law, Zicklin School of Business, Baruch College/CUNY. J.D.
1994, Fordham University School of Law; B.A. 1991, Brooklyn College/CUNY. I would like to
thank Melissa Glassman, Hope Glassman, Leo Glassman, and Harrison Glassman for their undying
support and inspiration. I would like to thank Alan C. Glassman, Esq., who inspired me to become
a lawyer, and who made my career as a lawyer possible.
1. Particularly those engaging in high-risk specialties, such as obstetrics and anesthesiology.
2. Weiss Ratings, Inc., The Impact of Non-Economic Damage Caps on Physician Premiums,
Claims Payout Levels, and Availability of Coverage, http://www.weissratings.com/malpractice.asp
(June, 2003).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Yank D. Coble, Jr., MD., AMA President, AMA Survey Shows Patients Losing Access to
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malpractice insurance are a national crisis, invading the practice of
medicine, threatening the availability of care, and prompting widespread
public outcry.”6
The AMA has warned, “[y]ou know that our health care system is
facing a crisis when patients have to leave their state to receive urgent
surgical care, or when pregnant women cannot find an obstetrician to
monitor their pregnancies and deliver their babies.”7 Furthermore, the
AMA has cautioned Americans that:
Escalating jury awards and the high cost of defending against lawsuits,
even meritless claims, are causing medical liability insurance
premiums to soar . . . [and that] . . . [o]ver the past two years, many
physicians have been hit with medical liability premium increases of
25 to 400 percent. As medical liability insurance becomes unaffordable
or unavailable, physicians are being forced to close their practices or
drop vital services—seriously affecting patient access to care. There
are now 19 states in crisis, up from 12 states last year. In many other
states a crisis is looming. The GAO recently studied five crisis states
and found examples of reduced access to care affecting emergency
surgery and newborn deliveries. We have no doubt that the GAO
would have found similar access problems had it examined the other
14 crisis states. This is why AMA worked so hard to seek passage of
H.R. 5 in the House, and why we continue to seek passage of similar
legislation in the Senate. One of the key provisions in H.R. 5 is a
$250,000.00 limit on non-economic damages, with flexibility for states
to adjust the cap to suit their circumstances. This limit on noneconomic damages has worked in California, and it can work
nationwide. As the GAO recently reported, medical liability insurance
premium growth has been slower in states with non-economic damage
caps that in states with limited reforms. Also, a recent study by the
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) shows that
reasonable limits on non-economic damages can improve the per
capita supply of physicians. We cannot afford the luxury of waiting
until the liability crisis gets worse to take action. Too many patients
will be hurt. We must bring common sense back to our courtrooms so

Care, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/article/1616-7494.html (April 3, 2003). According to the
AMA, these crisis states include: Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky,
Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Texas, Washington and West Virginia. (There are 18 not 19 states listed here) Id.
6. Weiss Ratings, supra note 2.
7. John C. Nelson, M.D., AMA President-Elect, AMA To Congress: Our Nation’s Liability
System Threatens Patients’ Access to Health Care, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/article/16168067.html, (October 1, 2003). Excepted from Dr. Nelson’s testimony before the House Government
Reform Subcommittee on Wellness and Human Rights (October 1, 2003).
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patients have access to physicians – in emergency rooms, delivery
rooms and operating rooms.8

Moreover, a March 2003 study9 conducted by the AMA concluded:
(1) 64.8 percent of America’s high-risk specialists have made changes
to their practice, including no longer providing certain services,
referring complex cases, closing their practice, and more; (2) 24.2
percent of high-risk specialists stopped providing certain services,
including emergency and trauma care and delivering babies; 92.4
percent of high-risk specialists said that liability pressures were
important in their decision to stop providing certain services; (3) 41.5
percent of high-risk specialists began referring complex cases; 34
percent of physicians surveyed in AMA crisis states began referring
complex cases compared to 24 percent in non-crisis states.10

In the past six months, the ongoing debate concerning the root
causes of the recent escalation in medical malpractice liability insurance
rates has reached a fevered pitch. Physicians and the insurance industry
place the blame on lawyers, excessive litigation and out-of-control jury
awards.11 The solution they propose, to wit, the imposition of caps on
non-economic damages in medical malpractice liability cases, has found
its way into numerous state legislatures, as well as the United States
Congress.12 As of June 2003, nineteen states have implemented caps on
non-economic damage.13
The battle cry for caps has, in large part, been adopted by
Republican legislators on both the state and federal level. Ultimately,
however, it is the objective of the GOP to federalize caps on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice liability cases, thus
preempting those states opposed to caps from resisting them any
longer.14
Opponents of the GOP’s efforts to federalize caps include
numerous Democratic state and federal legislators, the American Trial
Lawyer’s Association (ATLA), state trial lawyer associations, and
consumer watchdog groups. These critics of federal caps acknowledge
that while there is a growing epidemic in our health care system, jury

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
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verdicts are not the prime culprit.15 They further maintain that caps have
not proven successful in either diminishing insurance premiums, or, in
fact, stabilizing them in states where they have been implemented.16
Finally, opponents of caps maintain that the insurance industry is
diverting the public’s attention away from other, more significant causes
of escalating premiums, including, inter alia, the rising cost of medical
products, financial setbacks faced by insurers over the past four years,
and industry-wide mismanagement.17
This article seeks to uncover the truth behind America’s current
health care emergency. In so doing, the causes behind escalating
medical malpractice premiums over the past decade will be examined;
attention will be focused on the issue of whether caps on non-economic
damages have been successful in reducing insurance premiums in states
where they have been implemented.18 Finally, an alternative approach
than that taken by President Bush, Congressional Republicans, the
American Medical Association, and the insurance industry, will be
propounded.19
II. PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH’S VISION
On January 28, 2003, President George W. Bush delivered his State
of the Union Address.20 During this address, he launched the opening
salvo in his war to rehabilitate America’s ailing health care system, a
system he believes has fallen prey to “bureaucrats and trial lawyers” and
“excessive litigation.”21 The President declared:
Our . . . goal is high quality, affordable health care for all Americans.
The American system of medicine is a model of skill and innovation,
with a pace of discovery that is adding good years to our lives. Yet for
many people, medical care costs too much—and many have no
coverage at all. These problems will not be solved with a nationalized
health care system that dictates coverage and rations care.
Instead, we must work toward a system in which all Americans have a
good insurance policy, choose their own doctors, and seniors and lowincome Americans receive the help they need. Instead of bureaucrats
15. See infra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
16. See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
17. Id.
18. See infra notes 289-316 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 317-318 and accompanying text.
20. President of The United States, George W. Bush, State of the Union Address,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/ news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html (January 28, 2003).
21. Id.
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and trial lawyers and HMO’s, we must put doctors and nurses and
patients back in charge of American medicine.
....
To improve our health care system, we must address one of the prime
causes of higher cost, the constant threat that physicians and hospitals
will be unfairly sued. Because of excessive litigation, everybody pays
more for health care, and many parts of America are losing fine
doctors. No one has ever been healed by a frivolous lawsuit. I urge the
Congress to pass medical liability reform.22

III. THE PROPOSED FEDERAL LEGISLATION AIMED AT, INTER ALIA,
FEDERALIZING CAPS ON NON-ECONOMIC DAMAGES IN MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE LIABILITY CASES
A. House Resolution 5 (H.R. 5)
Within one week of the President’s State of the Union Address,
H.R. 5, officially titled,23 “To Improve Patient Access to Health Care
Services and Provide Improved Medical Care by Reducing the
Excessive Burden the Liability System Places on the Health Care
Delivery System,” was introduced in the United States House of
Representatives.24
22. Id.
23. H.R. 5, 108th Cong. (2003), available at http://www.congress.gov/cgibin/bdquery/z?d108:HR00005:@@@L& summ2=m&. The bill’s short title was “Help Efficient,
Accessible, Low-cost, Timely Healthcare (HEALTH) Act of 2003.” Id.
24. Id. The bill was formally introduced on February 5, 2003. Id. Following its introduction,
the bill proceeded along the following course:
2/5/2003: Referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, and in addition to the Committee
on Energy and Commerce, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker,
in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the
committee concerned. Referred to House Judiciary
3/4/2003: Committee Hearings Held.
3/5/2003: Committee Consideration and Mark-up Session Held. Ordered to be Reported
(Amended) by the Yeas and Nays: 15 - 13.
2/5/2003: Referred to House Energy and Commerce
2/14/2003: Referred to the Subcommittee on Health, for a period to be subsequently
determined by the Chairman.
3/4/2003: Referred to the Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection.
Subcommittee Consideration and Mark-up Session Held.
Forwarded by
Subcommittee to Full Committee (Amended) by Voice Vote.
3/6/2003: Committee Consideration and Mark-up Session Held. Ordered to be Reported
(Amended) by Voice Vote.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2004

5

Akron Law Review, Vol. 37 [2004], Iss. 3, Art. 1
GLASSMAN1.DOC

422

4/19/2004 10:24 AM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[37:417

While the bill was quite similar to H.R. 4600,25 which passed the
House in 2002 but never reached a vote in the Senate, H.R. 5 would
apply to any “health care lawsuit,” including civil actions against
manufacturers, distributors, suppliers, marketers, promoters, or sellers of
3/11/2003 6:51pm: Reported (Amended) by the Committee on Judiciary. H. Rept. 10832, Part I.
3/11/2003 6:52pm: Reported (Amended) by the Committee on Energy and Commerce.
H. Rept. 108-32, Part II. Placed on the Union Calendar, Calendar No. 20.
3/12/2003 9:52pm: Rules Committee Resolution H. Res. 139 Reported to House. Rule
provides for consideration of H.R. 5 with 2 hours of general debate. Previous question
shall be considered as ordered without intervening motions except motion to
recommit with or without instructions. Provides for 80 minutes equally divided and
controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on the
Judiciary and 40 minutes equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking
minority member of the Committee on Energy and Commerce. The rule waives all
points of order against consideration of the bill. Measure will be considered read. The
rule provides that in lieu of the amendments recommended by the Committees on the
Judiciary and on Energy and Commerce now printed in the bill, the amendment in the
nature of a substitute printed in the Rules Committee report (H. Rept. 108-34) shall be
considered as adopted. The rule provides that H.Res. 126 is laid on . . . .
3/13/2003 12:05pm: Rule H. Res. 139 passed House.
3/13/2003 12:06pm:
Considered under the provisions of rule H. Res. 139.
(consideration: CR H1817-1871, H1879-1880; text of measure as reported in House:
CR H1829-1832). H.AMDT.6 Amendment in the nature of a substitute reported by
the House Committee on Rules (consideration: CR H1832-1834; text: CR H18321834). An amendment in the nature of a substitute considered as adopted pursuant to
the provisions of H. Res. 139.
3/13/2003 12:07pm: H.AMDT.6 On agreeing to the Rules amendment (A001) Agreed
to without objection.
3/13/2003 2:35pm: The previous question was ordered pursuant to the rule. Mr.
Conyers moved to recommit with instructions to Judiciary and Energy and
Commerce.
3/13/2003 2:46pm: The previous question on the motion to recommit with instructions
was ordered without objection.
3/13/2003 3:06pm: On motion to recommit with instructions Failed by the Yeas and
Nays: 191 - 234 (Roll no. 63) (consideration: CR H1866-1871; text: CR H18661869).
3/13/2003 3:13pm: On passage Passed by recorded vote: 229 - 196, 1 Present (Roll No.
64) (text: CR H1832-1834).
3/13/2003 3:13pm: Motion to reconsider laid on the table Agreed to without objection.
3/13/2003: Received in the Senate.
3/20/2003: Read the first time. Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under Read the
First Time.
3/21/2003: Read the second time. Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General
Orders. Calendar No. 49.
Id.
25. H.R. 4600, 107th Cong. (2002), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/D?d107:1:./temp/~bd69UB: @@@X|/bss/d107query.html.
The House of
Representatives passed H.R. 4600, entitled the “Help Efficient, Accessible, Low Cost, Timely
Health Care (HEALTH) Act of 2002,” by a vote of 217 to 203, on September 26, 2002. See
Update: House Passes H.R. 4600, 165 PRODUCTS LIABILITY ADVISORY 8 (November 2002).
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drugs or medical devices, regardless of the theory of liability.26
In sum, H.R. 5 limits recovery of non-economic27 damages in
health care lawsuits to $250,000.28 Awards for future non-economic
damages would not be discounted to present value.29 The statute does
away with joint liability, thus, each tortfeasor’s liability would be limited
to his/her/its several share of any damages only, and not include the
share of any other person.30
As to punitive damages:
[T]he proposed law would (1) require proof by clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant acted with malicious intent to injure the
claimant or deliberately failed to avoid unnecessary injury that the
defendant knew the claimant was substantially certain to suffer; (2)
permit punitive damages to be sought only after a court finding of
substantial probability that the plaintiff would prevail; (3) bar punitive
damages where no compensatory damages are awarded; (4) limit the
amount of punitive damages to two times the amount of economic
damages awarded or $250,000.00, whichever is greater; and (5) bar
punitive awards, absent fraud or bribery, against manufacturers or
distributors of medical products unless it is demonstrated that the harm
resulted from a defendant’s failure to comply with a specific Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) requirement.31

Moreover, H.R. 5 limits an attorney’s entitlement32 to contingent
fees in a medical malpractice liability lawsuit.33 Specifically, the
maximum fee an attorney could charge a client in a medical malpractice
liability action would be limited to (1) 40 percent of the first $50,000
recovered; (2) 33 1/3 percent of the next $50,000; (3) 25 percent of the
next $500,000; and (4) 15 percent of any recovery in excess of

26. House Passes Bill That Would Limit Products Liability Claims Involving Medical
Products, 170 Products Liability Advisory 5 (April 2003).
27. Non-economic damages are generally those damages awarded for a litigant’s past and/or
future pain and suffering. House Resolution 5 defines non-economic damages as: “damages for
physical and emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, mental anguish,
disfigurement, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of society and companionship, loss of consortium
(other than loss of domestic service), hedonic damages, injury to reputation, and all other
nonpecuniary losses of any kind or nature.” H.R. 5, 108th Cong. (2003), available at
http://www.congress. gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:HR00005:@@@L&summ2=m&.
28. House Passes Bill, supra note 26.
29. Id. In essence, the bill calls for the annuitized payout of future, non-economic damages
awards in excess of $50,000. See id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. And, presumably, an attorney’s incentive to take such cases.
33. House Passes Bill, supra note 26.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2004

7

Akron Law Review, Vol. 37 [2004], Iss. 3, Art. 1
GLASSMAN1.DOC

424

4/19/2004 10:24 AM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[37:417

$600,000.34
Other provisions of the bill would: (1) establish a limitations
period35 of the earlier of (a) 3 years after the date of injury, or (b) 1 year
after the injury was or should have been discovered; and (2) allow
evidence of collateral source benefits.36
Finally, H.R. 5 seeks to preempt any contrary state law, except any
law that imposes greater protections, such as a shorter statute of
limitations for health care providers and health care organizations from
liability, loss, or damages than those provided by the Act.37 Also
exempted from preemption would be any state statutory limit on the
amount of damages that may be awarded in a health care lawsuit,
whether or not the state limit is more or less than the limit under this
Act; and any defense available to a party in a health care lawsuit.38
According to a number of dissenters in the House of
Representatives:39
[H.R. 5] offers a “solution” prior to having discovered the root of the
problem. Instead of reducing the occurrence of frivolous lawsuits,
providing direct assistance to health care providers and communities,
and examining every aspect of the problem, this legislation restricts the
legal rights of those who have been truly wronged.
....
While the rising cost of malpractice insurance is a real concern for
doctors and patients alike, we have serious reservations about this
proposed “solution” for three primary reasons. First, what has caused
the increase in malpractice insurance premiums is not easily identified.
Moreover, it is not clear that this legislation will reduce the medical
malpractice premiums that providers must pay to insurance companies.
Second, the scope and severity of the provisions in H.R. 5 impose
unreasonable restrictions on an injured patient’s ability to hold
34. Id.
35. The time within which a litigant must bring a lawsuit or forever be barred from doing so.
This is synonymous with the term “statute of limitations.” Limitation is defined as “a statutory
period after which a lawsuit or prosecution cannot be brought in court.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
939 (7th ed. 1999).
36. House Passes Bill, supra note 26.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Democratic Staff of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, Dissenting Views on H.R.
5: Help Efficient, Accessible, Low Cost, Timely Health Care (HEALTH) Act of 2003, http://www.
house.gov/commerce_democrats/ legviews/108lvhr0005.htm (March 2003). Representatives John
D. Dingell, Lois Capps, Jan Schakowsky, Frank Pallone, Jr., Ted Strickland, Hilda L. Solis, Sherrod
Brown, Edward J. Markey, Henry A. Waxman, Edolphus Towns, Rick Boucher, Bart Stupak, and
Mike Doyle. Id.
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wrongdoers accountable. Third, the legislation is over-broad,
protecting the interests of large corporations, such as Health
Maintenance Organizations (HMO’s) and drug companies, at the
expense of health care providers and patients. The legislation provides
nothing more than a shield for bad actors rather than meaningful
reforms for overburdened doctors and providers.
To find an effective solution, we must closely examine the insurance
industry and how its conduct affects medical malpractice premiums, an
activity not undertaken by this Committee. We know that many
factors completely unrelated to jury verdicts and the civil justice
system affect insurance rates: changes in state law and regulatory
requirements; competitiveness of the insurance market; the types of
policies issued within the industry; interest rates; and national
economic trends. Moreover, there is scant evidence to date that various
state tort reforms have realized appreciable premium savings. In a
comparison of states that enacted severe tort restrictions during the
mid-1980’s and those that resisted enacting tort reform, a recent study
found no correlation between tort reform and insurance rates.
Insurance markets are subject to cycles, periods of underpricing of
premiums to increase market share and book premium dollars,
followed by a hardening of the market. Once the market hardens,
competition intensifies, underwriting results deteriorate, and
investment incomes fall. Insurance companies then need to raise
premiums to cover losses. We are now in the midst of a ‘‘hard’’ phase
of the insurance cycle and increases in malpractice premiums are
consistent with overall market trends. This problem is not unique to
malpractice insurance. While medical malpractice insurance premiums
for the three riskiest specialties increased 10% from 2000 to 2001, auto
insurance premiums saw similar increases of 8.4% during that same
period.
A serious effort to provide relief to providers from high malpractice
premiums would have looked at these and other issues. A number of
Congressional Democrats have requested the General Accounting
Office look into these questions. The Committee, however, chose to
take a one-sided approach. Reps. Brown, Pallone, and Capps offered
amendments that would encourage insurance reforms both on the state
and federal levels. Each of those amendments was defeated on a
partisan basis. Rep. Dingell offered an amendment in the nature of a
substitute during the full Committee Markup of H.R. 5. The
Democratic substitute would have provided direct assistance to health
care providers and communities, reduced frivolous lawsuits, and
established an independent advisory commission to thoroughly
examine the problem and propose long-term solutions. It was also
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defeated on a partisan basis.40

Despite the above dissent, on March 13, 2003, H.R. 5 was approved
by the House of Representatives by a vote of 229 to 196.41 In response
to the passage of H.R. 5, the American Medical Association issued the
following press release:
The American Medical Association (AMA) applauds the House of
Representatives for passing true medical liability reform legislation,
which includes a $250,000.00 cap on non-economic damages. The
AMA thanks Representative Greenwood (R-PA), Chairman Tauzin (RLA), Chairman Sensenbrenner (R-WI) and Representative Cox (R-CA)
for their leadership on this issue of great importance to America’s
patients and physicians.
By voting “yes” to medical liability reform legislation, Congress
recognizes that our current medical liability system is broken and
threatening access to care for millions of Americans, particularly in
regard to high-risk medical care and services.
Doctors forced to move out of state, take early retirement, or stop
practicing high-risk procedures because of sky-rocketing insurance
premiums have left much of the nation in an access-to-care crisis or
near-crisis situation.
The legislation passed by Congress today is based on a proven reform
system in place in California since 1975. As a result, medical
insurance premiums in California have increased only 167 percent,
while premiums in the rest of the country have risen 505 percent.
Capping non-economic damages at $250,000.00 will help curb the
jackpot lottery mentality that is jeopardizing patient care in this
country.
The AMA, President Bush and now the House of Representatives
agree – common-sense medical liability reforms are needed to protect
patients’ access to care. The AMA looks forward to working with the
Senate to ensure passage of similar legislation that preserves access to
care for all Americans.42

40. Id.
41. See supra, note 24.
42. Yank D. Coble, Jr., M.D., AMA President, AMA Applauds Passage of H.R.5, http://www.
ama-assn.org/ama/pub/article/1617-7392.html (March 13, 2003).
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B. Senate Bill 607 (S. 607)
On March 12, 2003, S. 607, formally titled43 “A Bill to Improve
Patient Access to Health Care Services and Provide Improved Medical
Care by Reducing the Excessive Burden the Liability System Places on
the Health Care Delivery System,” was introduced in the United States
Senate by Nevada Senator John E. Ensign.44 While the bill was similar
to H.R. 5, it differed from H.R. 5 to the extent that it did not address
punitive damages, collateral source offsets, and the annuitized payments
of future non-economic damages in excess of $50,000.
C. Senate Bill 11 (S. 11)
Following passage of H.R. 5, in an effort to conform the Senate’s
bill to that of the House, Senator Ensign substituted S. 607 with S. 11.45
While similar in content to S. 607, S. 11 more closely followed H.R. 5
with its inclusion of provisions relating to punitive damages, collateral
source offsets and the annuitized payments of future non-economic
damages in excess of $50,000.
Recently, the advancement of Senator Ensign’s bill ground to halt
when its opponents successfully filibustered46 S. 11.47 On July 9, 2003,
43. S. 60, 108th Cong. (2003), available at http://www.congress.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:
SN00607:@@@L& summ2=m&. The bill’s short title was, “Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-Cost,
Timely Healthcare Act of 2003.” Id. Following its introduction, the bill proceeded along the
following course:
3/12/2003: Introduced in the Senate. Read the first time. Placed on Senate Legislative
Calendar under Read the First Time.
3/13/2003: Read the second time. Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General
Orders. Calendar No. 33.
Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. While S.11 bore the same official title as S.607, its short name was changed to
“HEALTH Act of 2003,” apparently to correspond with H.R.5. Id.
46. U.S. Senate, Filibuster and Cloture, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Filibuster _Cloture.htm. A filibuster is an attempt to block or delay Senate action on a
bill or other matter:
Using the filibuster to delay, debate or block legislation has a long history. In the United
States, the term filibuster—from a Dutch word meaning “pirate”—became popular in the
1850’s when it was applied to efforts to hold the Senate floor in order to prevent action
on a bill.
In the early years of Congress, representatives as well as senators could use the
filibuster technique. As the House grew in numbers, however, it was necessary to revise
House rules to limit debate. In the smaller Senate, unlimited debate continued [sic], since
senators believed any member should have the right to speak as long as necessary.
In 1841, when the Democratic minority hoped to block a bank bill promoted by
Henry Clay, Clay threatened to change Senate rules to allow the majority to close debate.
Thomas Hart Benton angrily rebuked his colleague, accusing Clay of trying to stifle the
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an attempt to break the filibuster, via a cloture vote, failed by 11 votes.48
Despite its failed progress, a further vote on S. 11 was expected in the
fall of 2003. It should be noted that some Senate Republicans
immediately hedged their bets, stating that in the event the Senate does
not pass S. 11, they will pursue “targeted amendments” aimed at
relieving specific medical specialties, including obstetricians and
emergency room physicians.49
D. The Unites States General Accounting Office Study
In the spring of 2003, a number of House Republicans supporting
limited medical malpractice damage awards requested a United States
General Accounting Office (GAO) study. In response thereto, the GAO
Senate’s right to unlimited debate. Unlimited debate remained in place in the Senate
until 1917. At that time, at the suggestion of President Woodrow Wilson, the Senate
adopted a rule (Rule 22) that allowed the Senate to end a debate with a two-thirds
majority vote—a tactic known as “cloture.”
The new Senate rule was put to the test in 1919, when the Senate invoked cloture
to end a filibuster against the Treaty of Versailles. Despite the new cloture rule, however,
filibusters continued to be an effective means to block legislation, due in part to the fact
that a two-thirds majority vote is difficult to obtain. Over the next several decades, the
Senate tried numerous times to evoke cloture, but failed to gain the necessary two-thirds
vote. Filibusters were particularly useful to southern senators blocking civil rights
legislation in the 1950’s and 1960’s. In 1975, the Senate reduced the number of votes
required for cloture from two-thirds (67) to three-fifths (60) of the 100 member Senate.
Id.
47. S. 11, 108th Cong. (2003), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/
z?d108:SN00011:@@@L&summ 2=m&. Following its introduction, the bill proceeded along the
following course:
6/27/2003: Introduced in the Senate. Read the first time. Placed on Senate Legislative
Calendar under Read the First Time. Read the second time. Placed on Senate Legislative
Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 186.
7/7/2003: Motion to proceed to consideration of measure made in Senate (consideration:
CR S8871-8893, S8893-8894). Cloture motion on the motion to proceed to the measure
presented in Senate (The motion to invoke cloture was filed by United States Senator
from Tennessee, and Senator Majority Leader William H. Frist, M.D., a former organ
transplant surgeon.).
7/8/2003: Motion to proceed to measure considered in Senate (consideration: CR
S9001-9009, S9010-9043).
7/9/2003: Motion to proceed to measure considered in Senate (consideration: CR
S9061-9083). Cloture on the motion to proceed to the measure not invoked in Senate by
Yea-Nay Vote. 49-48. Record Vote Number: 264 (consideration: CR S9083) (The
cloture rule-Rule 22-is the only formal procedure that Senate rules provide for breaking a
filibuster. http://www.senate.gov/reference/reference_index_subjects/Cloture_vrd.htm).
Id.
48. Id.
49. Press Release, Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, G.O.P. Focuses on Medical Malpractice
Caps, http://www.jsonline. com/news/nat/ap/sep03/ap-congress-malpra090503.asp (September 5,
2003).
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conducted an extensive analysis of the various factors that have
contributed to the dramatic increase in medical malpractice liability
insurance rates over the past four years.50 The results of the GAO’s
study were released in June of 2003. According to the GAO, the study
was performed because:
Over the past several years, large increases in medical malpractice
insurance premium rates have raised concerns that physicians will no
longer be able to afford malpractice insurance and will be forced to
curtail or discontinue providing certain services. Additionally, a lack
of profitability has led some large insurers to stop selling medical
malpractice insurance, furthering concerns that physicians will not be
able to obtain coverage. To help Congress better understand the
reasons behind the rate increases, the GAO undertook a study to (1)
describe the extent of the increases in medical malpractice insurance
rates, (2) analyze the factors that contributed to those increases, and (3)
identify changes in the medical malpractice market that might make
this period of rising premium rates different from previous such
periods.51

Ultimately, the GAO found that:
Multiple factors, including falling investment income and rising
reinsurance costs, have contributed to recent increases in premium
rates in our sample states.52 However, GAO found that losses on
medical malpractice claims—which make up the largest part of
insurers’ costs—appear to be the primary driver of rate increases in the
long run. And while losses for the entire industry have shown
persistent upward trend, insurers’ loss experiences have varied
dramatically across our sample states, resulting in wide variations in
premium rates. In addition, factors other than losses can affect
premium rates in the short run, exacerbating cycles within the medical
malpractice market. For example, high investment income or
adjustments to account for lower than expected losses may legitimately
permit insurers to price insurance below the expected cost of paying
50. United States General Accounting Office [GAO], Medical Malpractice Insurance:
Multiple
Factors
Have
Contributed
to
Increased
Premium
Rates,
www.gao.gov/new.items/d03702.pdf (June, 2003).
51. Id.
52. Id. These sample states included: California, Florida, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada,
Pennsylvania, and Texas. Id. According to the GAO:
[This m]ix of states [was] based on the following characteristics: extent of any recent
increases in premium rates, status as a “crisis state” according to the American medical
Association, presence of caps on non-economic damages, state population, and aggregate
loss ratios for medical malpractice insurers within the state.
Id.
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claims. However, because of the long lag between collecting
premiums and paying claims, underlying losses may be increasing
while insurers are holding premium rates down, requiring large
premium rate hikes when the increasing trend in losses is recognized.
While these factors may explain some events in the medical
malpractice market, the GAO could not fully analyze the composition
and causes of losses at the insurer level owing to a lack of
comprehensive data.53
GAO’s analysis also showed that the medical malpractice market has
changed considerably since previous hard markets. Physician-owned
and/or operated insurers now cover around 60 percent of the market,
self-insurance has become more widespread, and states have passed
laws designated to reduce premium rates. As a result, it is not clear
how premium rates might behave during soft or hard markets.54

Furthermore, the GAO recommended that no “executive action”55
be taken. It did, however, suggest:
[T]o further the understanding of conditions in current and future
medical malpractice markets, Congress may wish to consider
encouraging the National Association of Insurance Commissioners and
state insurance regulators to identify and collect additional, mutually
beneficial data necessary for evaluating the medical malpractice
insurance market.56

As to the issue of availability to medical care, the GAO found that
there were “localized but not widespread access problems,”57 however, it
added that these particular instances were often in rural locations where
keeping physicians has always been a problem.58
Finally, GAO investigators found that the reports of physicians
moving to other states, retiring, or closing practices in response to the
purported “crisis” complained of by the AMA were, in fact, not

53. Id. More specifically, in addition to claims, the GAO found that rate increases were
caused by the following three factors:
(1) decreases in investment income as interest rates form bonds decreased; (2)
competition for market shares that “for some insurers” did not cover their ultimate losses
on that business and; (3) reinsurance rates increased rapidly, starting in 2001, raising
insurers’ overall costs.
See Massachusetts Medical Society Online, GAO Reports on Causes of Medical Malpractice Rate
Increases, http://www.massmed.org/pages/GAO_report_July_2003.asp (August 1, 2003).
54. GAO, supra note 50.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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accurate.59
Despite the results of the GAO study, the GOP is expected to move
forward in its quest for federal medical malpractice caps.60
IV. THE STATES’ APPROACH
“Since 1975, 19 states have implemented these caps at various
levels ranging from $250,000.00 to $1 million.”61 A more detailed
analysis of how each state and the District of Columbia has dealt with
the issue of caps in medical malpractice liability cases is set forth below.

59. GAO, supra note 50.
60. Id.
61. See Weiss Ratings, supra, note 2 and accompanying text. The following chart is
excerpted from the Weiss Ratings study. This chart sets forth those states that have enacted caps in
medical malpractice liability actions.
State

Cap ($)

Year Adopted

Alaska

500,000

19972

California

250,000

1975

Colorado

250,000

1998

Hawaii

375,000

1976

Idaho

682,000

1990*

Indiana

1,000,000

1990

Kansas

250,000

1994

Louisiana

500,000

1975

Maryland

805,000

1986*

Massachusetts

500,000

1997

Michigan

624,000

1993*

Missouri

547,000

1988*

Montana

250,000

1997

New Mexico

600,000

1996

North Dakota

500,000

1996

Utah

250,000

1996

Virginia

1,000,000

1992

West Virginia

1,000,000

1986

Wisconsin

350,000

1995*3

*Caps are adjusted annually for inflation.

Alaska’s cap applies to incidents occurring before August 1997. Id. After August 1997: the cap is
the greater of $400,000 or life expectancy times $8,000 except in the case of severe disfigurement
or physical impairment in which the cap is the greater of $1 million or life expectancy times
$25,000. Id.
Wisconsin’s cap applies to damages from all health care providers except in wrongful death cases.
Id. Damages in wrongful death are limited to $500,000 for the death of a minor and $350,000 for
the death of an adult. Id.
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A. Alabama
The Alabama legislature passed the Medical Liability Act of 1987
to limit a plaintiff’s recovery in a medical malpractice suit to $400,000,
including punitive damages.62 The Alabama Supreme Court, however,
held the statute to be unconstitutional, but the statute has not been
repealed.63 The Court has also held to be unconstitutional a $250,000
cap on punitive damages,64 applicable to all cases except wrongful death
and those alleging a pattern of intentional wrongful conduct, actual
malice, or defamation.65 The legislature has since addressed the issue
and passed a cap on punitive damages in all civil actions to not exceed
compensatory damages or $500,000, whichever is greater.66 Except,
when the claim is for wrongful death or physical injury, punitive
damages shall not exceed $1,500,000.67
62. ALA. CODE § 6-5-544 (2003) (stating, “plaintiff shall not seek recovery in any amount
greater than the amounts described herein for noneconomic losses”). See generally, Symposium on
Tort Reform: VIII. Medical Malpractice: A Plaintiff Attorney’s Perspective, 24 CUMB. L. REV. 515
(1994) (reviewing specific provisions from the Medical Liability Act of 1987 that apply to the
medical profession); Symposium on Tort Reform: IX. Medical Malpractice: A Defense Attorney’s
Perspective, 24 CUMB. L. REV. 531 (1994) (criticizing the Alabama Supreme Court for overruling
the $400,000 damage cap in Moore v. Mobile Infirmity Ass’n, 592 So. 2d 156 (Ala. 1991)).
63. See Moore v. Mobile Infirmity Ass’n, 592 So. 2d 156 (Ala. 1991). The Alabama
Supreme Court reasoned, the correlation between the damage caps and “the reduction of health care
costs to the citizens of Alabama was, at best, indirect and remote.” Id. at 168. The court went on to
conclude that the unfair burden placed on “catastrophically injured victims of medical malpractice
against the indirect and speculative benefit that may be conferred upon society, represents an
unreasonable exercise of police power.” Id. at 170. Therefore, the section violates the equal
protection component of the Constitution of Alabama. Id. Another section of the Medical Liability
Act of 1987 was § 6-5-547, which attempted to place a 1,000,000 limit on wrongful death actions
brought against health care providers. ALA. CODE § 6-5-547 (2003). The Alabama Supreme Court,
however, declared this section unconstitutional because it was similar to Moore v. Mobile Infirmity
Ass’n as unreasonable “class legislation.” Smith v. Schulte, 671 So. 2d 1334 (Ala. 1995) (overruled
on different grounds in Ex parte Apicella, 809 So. 2d 865 (Ala. 2001)).
64. McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of Medical Malpractice Law: Alabama,
http://www.mcandl.com/ alabama.html (revised May 17, 1998); see Moore , 592 So.2d at 156; Ala.
Code § 6-11-21 (1993).
65. Id.; see Henderson v. Alabama Power Co., 627 So. 2d 878 (Ala. 1993).
66. ALA. CODE § 6-11-21 (2003). The statute lists three exceptions where the punitive
damage cap does not apply: in an action against a small business defendant, punitive damages shall
not exceed $50,000 or 10% of the business’ net worth; in actions for wrongful death or intentional
infliction of physical injury, punitive damages shall not exceed three times compensatory damages
or $1,500,000. Id.
67. Id. The Alabama legislature rewrote §6-11-21 in 1999 to provide caps on punitive
damages to apply “in all civil actions”, but listed three situations when the punitive damage cap
does not apply. Mobile Infirmary Medical Ctr. v. Hodgen, 2003 Ala. LEXIS 338, *30 (Ala. 2003).
This was in response to the Alabama Supreme Court declaring the old version, which placed a
general cap on punitive damages, unconstitutional in Henderson v. Alabama Power Co., 627 So. 2d
878 (Ala. 1993). Id. § 6-11-21 as amended “has been recognized as a complete replacement of the
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A series of judicial decisions holds that all damages in wrongful
death cases are considered punitive, and not compensatory.68 Punitive
damages may be awarded in cases of simple negligence, with no
requirement of willful or wanton behavior by defendants.69 The punitive
damages are assessed jointly and severally against all liable defendants,
regardless of their degrees of culpability, and with no right of
contribution.70 The awarding of punitive damages for simple negligence
has been upheld as constitutional under state law, case law, and federal
law.71
B. Alaska
In an action to recover damages for personal injury based on
negligence, accruing before August 7, 1997, damages for non-economic
losses are limited to compensation for pain, suffering, inconvenience,
physical impairment, and loss of enjoyment of life, and are limited to
$500,000 per plaintiff.72 The $500,000 limit does not apply to damage
awards for severe disfigurement or physical impairment.73
In an action to recover damages for personal injury or wrongful
death, accruing on or after August 7, 1997, all damage claims for noneconomic losses are limited to compensation for pain, suffering,
inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigurement, loss of enjoyment of
life, and loss of consortium.74 The amount of the basic cap is the greater
of $400,000 or the plaintiff’s life expectancy, in years, multiplied by
$8,000.75 In a personal injury action, when the damages are awarded for
severe permanent physical impairment or severe disfigurement, damages

old statutory restrictions on punitive damages.” Id. In Hodgen, the Court ultimately upheld the
statute by affirming the trial court’s judgment on the condition that it was lowered to meet the
$1,500,000 punitive damage cap. Id.
68. McCullough, Alabama, supra note 64; see Savannah & Memphis R.R. v. Schearer, 58
Ala. 672, 680 (Ala. 1877); Tatum v. Schering Corp., 523 So. 2d 1042 (Ala. 1988); Killough v.
Jahandarfard, 578 So. 2d 1041 (Ala. 1991) (minor decedent). Alabama’s wrongful death statutes do
not indicate this treatment by the courts. McCullough, Alabama, supra note 64; see Ala. Code § 65-391 (Supp. 1997) (for minors); § 6-5-410 (1993).
69. McCullough, Alabama, supra note 64; see Black Belt Wood Co. v. Sessions, 514 So. 2d
1249 (Ala. 1986).
70. Id.
71. Id.; see Killough v. Jahandarfard, 578 So. 2d 1041 (Ala. 1991); see Louis Pizitz Dry
Goods Co. v. Weldell, 274 U.S. 112 (1927).
72. ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.010 (Michie 1996); McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of
Medical Malpractice Law: Alaska, http://www.mcandl.com/alaska.html (revised February 6, 1998).
73. Id.
74. ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.010 (Michie 1997); McCullough, Alaska, supra note 72.
75. Id.
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may not exceed the greater of $1,000,000 or the plaintiff’s life
expectancy, in years, multiplied by $25,000.76 The amended statute
clarifies that multiple injuries sustained by one claimant resulting from
one incident are treated as a single injury, invoking only one cap, and
that consortium claims do not open up a second cap.77
Alaska also has a new cap on punitive damages, applicable to
claims accruing on or after August 7, 1997.78 Ordinarily punitive
damages will be limited to the greater of three times the compensatory
damages awarded to the plaintiff or $500,000.79 However, if the
defendant was motivated by financial gain and the adverse consequences
of his conduct were actually known, the limit is the greatest of four times
the compensatory damages awarded to the plaintiff, four times the
financial gain that the defendant received, or $7,000,000.80
C. Arizona
Arizona does not place a cap on the amount of damages recoverable
in a medical malpractice action.81 The Arizona constitution prohibits
enacting any law that limits the damages recoverable for personal injury
or death.82
D. Arkansas
Although Arkansas does not have a provision that specifically
limits the amount of damages in a medical malpractice action, the
legislature passed the Civil Justice Reform Act of 2003, which places a
limit on punitive damages.83 Judgments for plaintiffs in medical
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020 (Michie 2003); McCullough, Alaska, supra note 72. The
finder of fact first must determine if punitive damages are allowed in the action. ALASKA STAT. §
09.17.020 (Michie 2003). To award punitive damages, the plaintiff must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the defendant’s conduct was either outrageous, including acts done with
malice or bad motive, or evidenced reckless indifference to the interest of another person. Id. After
it has been determined that punitive damages can be awarded, a separate proceeding must be
conducted to determine the amount of punitive damages to be awarded. Id.
79. Id.; McCullough, Alaska, supra note 72.
80. Id.
81. McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of Medical Malpractice Law: Arizona,
http://www.mcandl.com/ arizona.html (revised February 6, 1998).
82. ARIZ. CONST. of 1911, art. II, § 31.
83. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-208 (2003). The statute places a punitive damage limit of “(1)
$250,000 or (2) three times the amount of compensatory damages awarded in the action, not to
exceed $1,000,000.” Id. The statute creates an exception to when the section will not apply—when
the fact finder “(1) determines by clear and convincing evidence that, at the time of the injury, the
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malpractice actions that exceed $100,000 are to be paid by periodic
payments as determined by the court, rather than by a lump sum
payment.84 All medical malpractice injury cases must be brought within
two years after the cause of action accrues.85
E. California
In California, damages for non-economic losses, defined as
compensation for pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment,
disfigurement and other non-pecuniary injury, are limited to $250,000.86
The cap applies whether the action is for personal injury or wrongful
death, allowing only one $250,000 recovery in a wrongful death case.87
There is authority for allowing separate caps for the patient and a spouse
claiming loss of consortium.88 The cap on non-economic damages has
been held to be constitutional.89
F. Colorado
Damages for medical malpractice against a hospital or physician
may not exceed $1,000,000 per patient, including any claim for
derivative non-economic loss or injury by any other claimant.90 Not
more than $250,000 may be attributable to non-economic loss or
injury.91 However, if the court finds that the future economic damages
defendant intentionally pursued a course of conduct for the purpose of causing injury or damage;
and (2) determines that the defendant’s conduct did, in fact, harm the plaintiff.” Id.
84. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-208 (2003). The statute states that damages may include
compensation for actual economic losses including “the cost of reasonable and necessary medical
services, rehabilitation services, custodial care, loss of services, and loss of earnings or earning
capacity.” Id.
85. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-203 (2003). If the medical injury involves a foreign object in
the body that could not have reasonably been discovered, the action can be brought within one year
from the date of discovery. Id.
86. CAL. CIVIL CODE §3333.2 (West 1997). For a more detailed analysis of California’s
medical malpractice cap law, see § V, infra.
87. McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of Medical Malpractice Law: California,
http://www.mcandl.com/ california.html (revised February 6, 1998); see Yates v. Pollock, 239 Cal.
Rptr. 383 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1987).
88. Id.; see Atkins v. Strayhorn, 273 Cal. Rptr. 231 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1990).
89. Id.; see Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 695 P.2d 665 (Cal. 1985) (also upholding the
modification of the collateral source rule).
90. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-64-302 (West 1997); McCullough, Campbell & Lane,
Summary of Medical Malpractice Law: Colorado, http://www.mcandl.com/ colorado.html (revised
February 6, 1998).
91. Id. Effective July 1, 2003, this damages limitation increases to $300,000, to adjust for
inflation, applying to acts or omissions occurring on or after July 1, 2003. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-64-302 (West 1997).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2004

19

Akron Law Review, Vol. 37 [2004], Iss. 3, Art. 1
GLASSMAN1.DOC

436

4/19/2004 10:24 AM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[37:417

exceed this cap, and to impose the limitation would be unfair, it may
award damages in excess of the limit.92 This damage cap was held to be
constitutional in Scholz v. Metropolitan Pathologists, P.C.93 The court
also held that the medical malpractice damage cap superceded the
general statutory cap applicable to other types of cases.94
Punitive damages may not exceed the amount of actual damages
awarded.95 However, the court may increase the punitive damage award
to an amount three times the amount of actual damages if the defendant
has continued the behavior or repeated the action which is the subject of
the claim in a willful and wanton manner, or if the defendant has further
aggravated the plaintiff’s damages by acting in a willful and wanton
manner during the pendency of the action.96 Punitive damages shall not
be imposed when the injury results from the use of an approved drug or
product used in accordance with standards of prudent health care
professionals.97
G. Connecticut
Connecticut does not impose a cap on damages recoverable in
medical malpractice actions.98
H. Delaware
Delaware does not place a limit on the damages a claimant may
recover.99
I. District of Columbia
The District of Columbia does not place a cap on the amount of
damages recoverable in a medical malpractice action.100

92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
851 P.2d 901 (Colo. 1993).
Id.; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-102.5 (West 1997).
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-102 (West 1997); McCullough, Colorado, supra note

90.
96. Id.
97. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-64-302.5 (West 1997); McCullough, Colorado, supra note
90.
98. McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of Medical Malpractice Law: Connecticut,
http://www.mcandl.com/ connecticut (revised February 6, 1998).
99. McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of Medical Malpractice Law: Delaware,
http://www.mcandl.com/ delaware (revised February 6, 1998).
100. McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of Medical Malpractice Law: District of
Columbia, http://www. mcandl.com/dc.html (revised February 6, 1998).
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J. Florida
After an acrimonious battle between Florida Governor Jeb Bush
and the Florida State Senate in the past legislative session, the Florida
House and Senate finally reached agreement on medical malpractice
reform:
The disagreement began with the Governor and the House insisting
upon a $250,000.00 cap on non-economic damages, and the Senate
being critical of any cap on damages. Subsequently, the House
increased its proposed cap to $1 million, with the Senate deciding to
back a “pierceable” cap. The “pierceable” cap would allow noneconomic damages to be granted in the range of $250,000.00 to $1
million, but would allow the collection of up to $4 million dollars in
cases of catastrophic injury or death.101

The compromise bill passed the legislature on August 13, 2003.102
Essentially, the bill caps non-economic damages at $500,000 per
physician and $750,000 per hospital or healthcare facility.103 There are
two important exceptions:
The first exception provides more protection for emergency room
physicians, capping their non-economic damages at $150,000.00 per
physician and $300,000.00 total (from all practitioners). The second
exception allows malpractice victims in the most egregious cases to
collect a total of $2.5 million in non-economic damages — $1 million
from physicians (by suing multiple doctors) and $1.5 million from
hospitals or other health care facilities (by suing multiple facilities).104

Generally, punitive damages may not exceed the greater of three
times the claimant’s compensatory damages or $500,000.105 If the fact
finder determines that the wrongful conduct was motivated solely by
unreasonable financial gain and the unreasonably dangerous nature of
the conduct was actually known by the defendant, it may award punitive
damages not to exceed the greater of four times the amount of
compensatory damages or $2,000,000.106 Furthermore, if the fact finder
determines that at the time of the injury the defendant had a specific

101. American Osteopathic Association, State Government Affairs: Florida Passes PLI Reform
Legislation, http://www.aoa-net.org/Government/stateaffairs/floridaupdate.htm (August 2003).
102. Id. The compromise bill is the common name of Senate Bill 2d and House Bill 1d. Id
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. FLA. STAT. ANN. §768.73 (West 1999).
106. Id.
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intent to harm the claimant, then there is no cap on punitive damages.107
In addition to its new law, which imposes caps, Florida’s voluntary
arbitration scheme also provides a cap on non-economic damages under
certain circumstances.108 Florida provides that a court may require, upon
motion of either party, that the claim be submitted to non-binding
arbitration.109 There is also a process where the parties can submit to
voluntary binding arbitration.110
A proceeding for voluntary binding arbitration is an alternative to a
jury trial.111 The Florida system provides that parties may submit to
voluntary binding arbitration for the determination of damages, which
gives the defendant an option to limit non-economic damages in return
for admitting liability.112 Once this option is chosen, it is the exclusive
means by which to seek recovery.113 If a defendant refuses to accept the
claimant’s offer to arbitrate, the claimant, if successful at trial, is entitled
to pre-judgment interest and up to 25 percent of the award in attorneys’
fees.114 If a claimant refuses to accept a defendant’s offer to arbitrate,
his recovery will be limited to economic damages, including past and
future medical expenses and 80 percent of lost wages, plus no more than
$350,000 in non-economic damages.115 If the claimant accepts the offer
to arbitrate, recovery will be limited to economic damage, including past
and future medical expenses and 80 percent of lost wages, plus no more
than $250,000 in non-economic damages, plus attorneys’ fees.116 The
damage cap in the arbitration statute has been held to be
constitutional.117 A state appellate court decision held that an arbitrator
can award no more than $250,000 for a single wrongful death claim,
regardless of the number of claimants.118 The Florida supreme court
107. Id.
108. McCullough,
Campbell
&
Lane, Medical
Malpractice
Law:
Florida,
http://www.mcandl.com/florida.html (revised February 6, 1998).
109. FLA. STAT. ANN §766.107 (West 1997).
110. FLA. STAT. ANN §766.207 (West 2003).
111. FLA. STAT. ANN §766.209 (West 2003). If neither party requests or agrees to voluntary
binding arbitration, the claim proceeds to trial. Id.
112. FLA. STAT. ANN §766.209 (West 2003); McCullough, Florida, supra note 108. Upon the
completion of a pre-suit investigation with preliminary reasonable ground for a medical negligence
claim, the parties may elect to have damages determined through binding arbitration. FLA. STAT.
ANN §766.209 (West 2003).
113. McCullough, Florida, supra note 108.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. FLA. STAT. ANN §766.209 (West 2003); McCullough, Florida supra note 108.
117. University of Miami v. Echarte, 618 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 915
(1993); McCullough, Florida, supra note 108.
118. St. Mary’s Hosp. v. Phillipe, 699 So.2d 1017 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); McCullough,
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found that the cap on non-economic damages of $250,000 per incident in
a voluntary arbitration under § 766.207 applies to each claimant.119
K. Georgia
Georgia does not place a cap on the amount of compensatory
damages that may be awarded.120 However, punitive damages are
capped at $250,000, unless the claimant can successfully demonstrate
that the defendant had an intent to harm.121
L. Hawaii
Hawaii limits damages recoverable for pain and suffering to
$375,000.122 This limitation does not apply to intentional torts, torts
relating to environmental pollution, toxic and asbestos related torts, torts
relating to aircraft accidents, or strict and products liability torts.123
M. Idaho
Non-economic damages for personal injury or wrongful death may
not exceed $250,000.124 The $250,000 cap has been adjusted on July 1
of each year since 1988 by the rate of increase or decrease in average
wages in Idaho.125 The limitation on non-economic damage awards is
inapplicable to causes of action arising out of willful or reckless
misconduct and to causes of action arising out of acts constituting a
felony under state or federal law.126 Punitive damages are not to exceed
the greater of $250,000 or an amount which is three times the
compensatory damages.127 In addition, Idaho law gives judges more
power than the law of most states to reduce damages that are
unsupported or unjustified, or is so unreasonably disproportionate to the

Florida, supra note 108.
119. St. Mary’s Hosp. v. Phillipe, 769 So.2d 961 (Fla. 2000).
120. McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of Medical Malpractice Law: Georgia,
http://www.mcandl.com/ georgia.html (revised February 6, 1998).
121. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1 (1992); McCullough, Georgia, supra note 120.
122. HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-8.7 (1995); McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of
Medical Malpractice Law: Hawaii, http://www.mcandl.com/ hawaii.html (revised February 6,
1998).
123. HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-10.9 (1995).
124. IDAHO CODE § 6-1603 (Michie 2003).
125. IDAHO CODE § 6-1603 (Michie 2003). McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of
Medial Malpractice Law: Idaho, http://www.mcandl.com/idaho.html (revised February 6, 1998).
126. Id.
127. IDAHO CODE § 6-1604 (Michie 2003).
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loss or damage suffered to be unconscionable.128
N. Illinois
Illinois has no cap on compensatory damages, but punitive damages
are not allowed.129 In 1995, the Illinois legislature passed a $500,000
limit on non-economic damages in medical malpractice cases, but this
was specifically held unconstitutional in Best v. Taylor Machine
Works.130 The Best decision did not invalidate a pre-existing statute
prohibiting punitive damages in medical malpractice cases.131
O. Indiana
The limits on recoveries in medical malpractice claims against
qualified providers have increased substantially under new legislation
scheduled to take effect in cases arising out of acts of malpractice that
occur on or after July 1, 1999.132 For claims accruing prior to January 1,
1990, the total amount recoverable for an injury or death of a patient
may not exceed $500,000.133 As of January 1, 1990, the maximum
recoverable was increased to $750,000.134 For claims accruing on or
after July 1, 1999, the total cap on damages against all is $1,250,000.135
A health care provider qualified under the statute is not liable for an
amount in excess of $250,000.136 The original version of the cap was
held to be constitutional in Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital.137
P. Iowa
Iowa does not place a cap on the amount of damages recoverable in
a medical malpractice action.138
128. IDAHO CODE § 6-807 (Michie 1997).
129. McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of Medical Malpractice Law: Illinois,
http://www.mcandl.com/ illinois.html (revised August 31, 2002); see 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §
5/2-1115.1 (West Supp. 2002). In all cases where the plaintiff seeks damages for medical or
hospital malpractice, no punitive damages are allowed. Id.
130. 689 N.E.2d 1057 (Ill. 1997).
131. Id.; see 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 5/2-1115 (West 1992).
132. McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of Medical Malpractice Law: Indiana,
http://www.mcandl.com/ indiana.html (revised July 30, 1999).
133. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-18-14-3 (West Supp. 1998); McCullough, Indiana supra note 132.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. 404 N.E.2d 585, 598-602 (Ind. 1980); McCullough, Indiana, supra note 132.
138. McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of Medical Malpractice Law: Iowa,
http://www.mcandl.com/iowa. html (revised February 6, 1998).
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Q. Kansas
In any personal injury action, non-economic damages are limited to
a total of $250,000 per plaintiff as against all defendants.139 If the action
is tried to a jury, the court should not instruct the jury about this
limitation, and if the jury awards non-economic damages in excess of the
limit, the judge should enter an award of $250,000.140 This statute has
been interpreted to mean that separate claims brought within a single
action should be aggregated under the cap, not treated separately.141 In
wrongful death actions, damages are limited to $250,000, except for
pecuniary loss sustained by an heir at law.142 Both of these limitations
have been upheld as constitutional.143 The Supreme Court of Kansas
held that statutes setting an absolute cap in medical malpractice actions,
rather than a cap on non-pecuniary damages only, were unconstitutional
in Kansas Malpractice Victims Coalition v. Bell.144
In any civil action, punitive damages are limited to the lesser of the
defendant’s highest gross income for the prior five years or
$5,000,000.145 If the court determines this amount is clearly inadequate
to penalize the defendant, the court may award up to 50 percent of the
net worth of the defendant.146 If the court finds the profitability of the
defendant’s misconduct exceeds the limitation, the limitation on that
amount of punitive damages which the court may award shall be an
amount equal to one and one half times the profit instead.147 The judge,
not the jury, determines the amount of punitive damages.148 Punitive
damages are not available in a wrongful death case.149

139. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-19a02 (1994); McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of
Medical Malpractice Law: Kansas, http://www.mcandl.com/kansas.html (revised September 4,
2002).
140. Id.
141. Hoover v. Innovative Health of Kansas, Inc., 988 P.2d 287 (Kan. 1999); McCullough,
Kansas, supra note 139.
142. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1903 (Supp. 2001); McCullough, Kansas, supra note 139.
143. Samsel v. Wheeler Transp. Serv., Inc., 789 P.2d 541 (Kan. 1990); Leiker v. Gafford, 778
P.2d 823 (Kan. 1989); McCullough, Kansas, supra note 139.
144. 757 P.2d 251 (Kan. 1988); McCullough, Kansas, supra note 139.
145. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3702 (1994); McCullough, Kansas, supra note 139.
146. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3702 (1994).
147. Id; McCullough, Kansas, supra note 139.
148. Id.
149. Smith v. Printup, 938 P.2d 1261 (Kan. 1997) (also holding statute constitutional);
McCullough, Kansas, supra note 139.
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R. Kentucky
Kentucky does not impose a statutory cap on damages recoverable
in medical malpractice actions.150
S. Louisiana
In Louisiana, there is no damage cap for those not insured by the
state, but qualified health care providers have their liability limited to
$100,000.151 Punitive damages are not recoverable in Louisiana, except
as specifically authorized by statute.152
T. Maine
Maine does not impose a cap on the amount of damages that may
be collected in a medical malpractice action.153 Non-economic damages
in a wrongful death action are limited to $400,000 and punitive damages
are limited to $75,000.154
U. Maryland
Maryland limits non-economic damages for any personal injury
cause of action for medical malpractice accruing after July 1, 1986.155
The limit was originally $350,000, but for causes of actions arising on or
after October 1, 1994, the limit has been increased to $500,000.156
Beginning October 1, 1995, and every October 1 thereafter, the limit on
non-economic damages is increased by $15,000.157 Non-economic
damages in personal injury actions include pain, suffering,
inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigurement, loss of consortium,
and other non-pecuniary damages, but not punitive damages.158 The cap
150. McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of Medical Malpractice Law: Kentucky,
http://www.mcandl.com/ kentucky (revised February 6, 1998).
151. McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of Medical Malpractice Law: Louisiana,
http://www.mcandl.com/louisiana.html (revised February 6, 1998); see Billiot v. B.P. Oil Co., 645
So.2d 604 (La. 1994).
152. Id.
153. McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of Medical Malpractice Law: Maine,
http://www.mcandl.com/ maine.html (revised February 6, 1998).
154. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-804 (West 1999).
155. MD. CODE ANN., Cts. and Jud. Proc. § 11-108 (Supp. 1997); McCullough, Campbell &
Lane, Summary of Medical Malpractice Law: Maryland, http://www.mcandl.com/maryland.html
(revised February 6, 1998).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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on non-economic damages applies to each “direct victim” of the tort and
all those claiming injury by or through him.159 The statute has been
found not to violate Maryland’s constitution.160
Prior to the 1994 amendment, the statute had been found not to
apply to wrongful death cases.161 However, the statute now provides
that the cap applies to wrongful death cases, and that the total recovery
of all beneficiaries in a wrongful death case cannot exceed 150 percent
of the cap.162
V. Massachusetts
In Massachusetts, in a medical malpractice case, the jury is
instructed that if it finds the defendant liable, it is not to award the
plaintiff more than $500,000 for pain and suffering, loss of
companionship, embarrassment, and other items of general damages,
unless it determines that there is
a substantial or permanent loss or impairment of a bodily function or
substantial disfigurement, or other special circumstances in the case
which warrant a finding that imposition of such a limitation would
deprive the plaintiff of just compensation for the injuries sustained.163

W. Michigan
Michigan limits non-economic damages, including pain, suffering,
inconvenience, physical impairment, and physical disfigurement, in a
medical malpractice action.164 The maximum for all plaintiffs, resulting
from the negligence of all defendants, was set at $280,000 in 1993.165 In
instances of paralysis due to brain or spinal cord injury, impairment of
cognitive capacity, or loss of reproductive ability, in which case the limit
159. Oaks v. Connors, 660 A.2d 423 (Md. 1995) (a single cap applies to the injured person’s
claim and the spouse’s consortium claim); McCullough, Maryland, supra note 155.
160. Murphy v. Edmonds, 601 A.2d 102 (Md. 1992); McCullough, Maryland, supra note 155.
161. United States v. Streidel, 620 A.2d 905 (Md. 1993); McCullough, Maryland, supra note
155.
162. MD. CODE ANN., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 11-108 (Supp. 1997); McCullough, Maryland, supra
note 155.
163. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60H (West 2000). This standard can often be met, so the
cap should not be relied on. Id. McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of Medical Malpractice
Law: Massachusetts, http://www.mcandl.com/massachusetts.html (revised February 6, 1998).
164. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.1483 (West 1996); McCullough, Campbell & Lane,
Summary of Medical Malpractice Law: Michigan, http://www.mcandl.com/michigan.html (revised
August 31, 2002).
165. Id.
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was $500,000.166 These caps are increased annually with the cost of
living, and as of 2002 were $349,700 and $624,500.167 The jury is not to
be advised of the damage limits, but any jury award in excess of these
amounts must be reduced by the court.168
The current statutory caps apply only to causes of action arising on
or after April 1, 1994.169 The statute, before it was amended in 1994,
had a major exception to the cap, including death or loss of a vital bodily
function, and the latter exception was interpreted broadly.170 The
statutory cap on non-economic damages was held constitutional.171 The
current statute makes no specific reference to wrongful death, and it has
been held that the wrongful death act governs, precluding the application
of the medical malpractice cap.172
X. Minnesota
Minnesota has not enacted a cap on the damages that can be
awarded in a medical malpractice case.173
Y. Mississippi
In October 2002, Mississippi enacted a law capping non-economic
damages for claims for causes of action filed before July 1, 2011, at
$500,000.174 For claims for causes of action filed on or after July 1,
2011, but before July 1, 2017, the limit increases to $750,000.175 For
claims for causes of action filed on or after July 1, 2017, the limit
increase to $1,000,000.176 The statutory scheme requires cases to be
filed only in the county where the cause of action occurred, shortening
the statute of limitations for suing nursing homes from three to two
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.6304(5) (West 2000); McCullough, Michigan, supra
note 164.
169. Tobin v. Provid. Mem’l Hosp., 624 N.W.2d 548 (Mich. 2001); McCullough, Michigan,
supra note 164.
170. Lewis v. Krogol, 582 N.W.2d 524 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998), cert. denied 598 N.W.2d 632
(Mich. 1999); McCullough, Michigan, supra note 164.
171. Zdrojewski v. Murphy, 657 N.W.2d 721 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002).
172. Jenkins v. Patel, 662 N.W.2d 453 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003).
173. McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of Medical Malpractice Law: Minnesota,
http://www.mcandl.com/ minnesota (revised February 6, 1998).
174. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-60 (2003); Insurance Information Institute, Hot Topics and
Insurance Issues: Medical Malpractice, http://www.iii.org/ media/hottopics/insurance/medicalmal/
(September 2003).
175. Id.
176. Id.
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years, and other provisions.177
Z. Missouri
In any medical malpractice action for damages for personal injury
or death, a claimant’s recovery of non-economic damages from any one
defendant is limited by statute.178 The limitation amount is adjusted on
January 1 of each year in accordance with a standard index of
inflation.179 For 2004, the cap was approximately $565,000 from any
one defendant.180 The cap is calculated annually by the Director of the
Division of Insurance and published in the Missouri Register.181 The
damage cap, together with other tort reform measures, has been held to
be constitutional.182
It should be noted, “[f]ollowing Missouri Governor Bob Holden’s
[recent] veto of a tort reform bill that contained a number of provisions
unrelated to medical malpractice, the Missouri State Medical
Association now says it would support legislation dealing solely with
medical malpractice concerns.”183
AA. Montana
For medical malpractice causes of action arising on or after October
1, 1995, Montana limits the award for past and future damages for noneconomic loss to $250,000.184 Non-economic damages is defined as
subjective, non-monetary loss, including but not limited to, physical and
mental pain and suffering, emotional distress, inconvenience, loss from
physical impairment or disfigurement, loss of companionship or
consortium, and injury to reputation or humiliation.185 The cap applies
only once to an injury even if caused by a series of acts and more than

177. Ins. Info. Inst., supra note 174.
178. MO. ANN. STAT. § 538.210 (West 1988); McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of
Medical Malpractice Law: Missouri, http://www.mcandl.com/missouri.html (revised February 6,
1998).
179. Id.
180. Missouri Register, Mo. Reg., Vol. 29, No. 6 (March 15, 2004).
181. MO. ANN. STAT. § 538.210 (West 1988); McCullough, Missouri, supra note 178.
182. Adams v. Children’s Mercy Hosp., 832 S.W.2d 898 (Mo. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S.
991 (1992); McCullough, Missouri, supra note 178.
183. Ins. Info. Inst., supra note 174.
184. MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-9-411 (1997); McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of
Medical Malpractice Law: Montana, http://www.mcandl.com/montana.html (revised February 6,
1998).
185. Id.
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one health care provider.186 The jury is not instructed about the cap and
any award that exceeds it is reduced by the court.187
BB. Nebraska
Nebraska does not generally impose limits on compensatory
damages in medical malpractice actions.188 Special rules apply to health
care providers that qualify for state-sponsored excess insurance.189 It is
a fundamental rule of law in Nebraska that punitive, vindictive, or
exemplary damages are not allowed.190
CC. Nevada
In May 2003, Nevada Gov. Kenny Guinn signed into law a bill that
prohibits medical malpractice insurers from using any financial loss
sustained through investments as justification for increasing premiums
paid by doctors.191 The law also includes a provision that prohibits
medical malpractice insurers from basing rates for obstetricians on the
number of babies they deliver in a year.192
In July 2002, the state passed Assembly Bill 1, limiting noneconomic damages to $355,000, adopting new joint and several liability
standards for economic damages, and limiting physician liability in

186. Id.
187. Id.
188. McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of Medical Malpractice Law: Nebraska,
http://www.mcandl.com/ nebraska.html (revised February 6, 1998).
189. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2829 (1993). Nebraska provides an excess liability fund for the
benefit of qualified health care providers. Id. To qualify for coverage by the excess liability fund, a
health care provider must file proof of financial responsibility and pay a surcharge. NEB. REV.
STAT. § 44-2824 (Supp. 1996). Physicians establish their financial responsibility by obtaining
professional liability insurance in the amount of $200,000 per occurrence and $600,000 in the
aggregate. Id. Hospitals establish their financial responsibility by obtaining insurance in the amount
of $200,000 per occurrence and $1,000,000 in the aggregate. Id. Hospitals run by the University of
Nebraska may prove financial responsibility by establishing a self-insurance trust. NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 44-2827.01 (1993). Once a health care provider has qualified under the Act, the Act becomes the
exclusive method of recovery, unless the claimant has elected in writing prior to treatment not to
come under the provisions of the Act. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 44-2821 and 44-2840 (1993 & Supp.
1996). The total amount recoverable under the Nebraska Hospital-Medical Liability Act for any
occurrence resulting in injury or death is $1,250,000 (or $1,000,000 if the occurrence took place
prior to 1993). NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2825 (1993). The liability of a single qualified health care
provider is limited to $200,000 per patient. Id. The excess liability fund pays the damages in excess
of $200,000 for each defendant, up to the amount of the cap. Id.
190. Miller v. Kingsley, 230 N.W.2d 472 (Neb. 1975).
191. Ins. Info. Inst., supra note 174.
192. Id.
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government and non-profit trauma facilities to $50,000.193
DD. New Hampshire
The New Hampshire legislature has placed a $250,000 limitation on
medical malpractice damages.194 The New Hampshire Supreme Court,
however, has declared the medical malpractice damage cap
unconstitutional.195 The legislature has also attempted to place an
$875,000 limitation on personal injury actions,196 but the court overruled
the statute.197 New Hampshire has outlawed punitive damages, unless
punitive damages are expressly provided by statute.198
Damages recoverable in a wrongful death action may not exceed
$50,000, except where the party recovering is a spouse, child, parent, or
any dependent relative.199 Damages are never awarded for loss of
society and companionship in death cases, except that effective January
1, 1998, such damages may be awarded to a surviving spouse, up to a
limit of $150,000.200
EE. New Jersey
New Jersey has recently been a hot bed for protest by physicians,
with the issue of caps and insurance reform coming to a head following
a physicians’ strike in 2003:
In a shift of position, New Jersey, Insurance Commissioner Holly
Bakke says that she favors dropping, for the time being, any attempt to
cap non-economic damages in medical malpractice cases and supports
subsidies to help doctors pay for their insurance. She also suggests that
reimbursement for doctors needs attention, noting that while doctors
used to be able to pass their insurance costs along to patients in the
past, they can no longer do so because most are under contracts with
193. A.B. 1, 2002 Nevada Laws, 18th Sp. Sess. (Nev. 2002); Jerome Harleston, Medical
Malpractice Tort Reform, http://www.cga.state.ct.us/2002/olrdata/ins/rpt/2002-R-0782.htm.
194. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-C:7 (1997).
195. See Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980) (holding the statute violates the state’s
equal protection clause: “[It] arbitrarily and unreasonably discriminates in favor of the class of
health care providers. Although the statute may promote the legislative objective of containing
health care costs, the potential cost to the general public and the actual cost to many medical
malpractice plaintiffs is simply too high.”).
196. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508-4-d (1997).
197. See Brannigan v. Usitalo, 587 A.2d 1232 (N.H. 1991) (concluding that the statute violates
the equal protection component of the state’s constitution).
198. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-16 (2003).
199. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 556-13 (1997).
200. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 556-12 (Supp. 1997).
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HMO’s. And she wants insurers to look more carefully at the fact that
a small percentage of doctors are responsible for a disproportionate
number of claims and that doctors in particularly risky specialties, e.g.
obstetrics and neurosurgery, are penalized for taking on the risks. She
noted that the medical malpractice insurance crisis has been slightly
alleviated by the increasing number of claims-made policies now
available in the state. An earlier proposal to set a $300,000.00 limit on
insurers’ liability for non-economic damages in malpractice cases, with
damage awards over $300,000.00 being paid from a fund created
through a surcharge on doctors, lawyers and employers is dead.201

Current law says that for actions filed on or after October 27, 1997,
no defendant is liable for any punitive damages in any action for an
amount in excess of five times the liability of that defendant for
compensatory damages, or $350,000, whichever is greater.202
FF. New Mexico
New Mexico created a statutory scheme which limited liability for
health care providers that met qualification requirements.203 In medical
malpractice actions against a qualified health care provider tried before a
jury, a $600,000 limit applies to all damages, with the exception of
punitive damages and damages for medical expenses.204 For incidents
prior to April 1, 1995, the limit is $500,000.205 The $600,000 limit on
damages does not include future medical expenses, which are not
covered by monetary damages.206 If the jury finds that a plaintiff
201. Ins. Info. Inst., supra note 174.
202. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.14(b) (West Supp. 1997); McCullough, Campbell & Lane,
Summary of Medical Malpractice Law: New Jersey, http://www.mcandl.com/newjersey (revised
February 6, 1998).
203. N. M. STAT. ANN. § § 41-5-5 and 41-5-6 (Michie 1996 and Supp. 1997).
204. McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of Medical Malpractice Law: New Mexico,
http://www.mcandl.com/ newmexico.html (revised February 6, 1998). Under New Mexico law, a
patient’s compensation fund, established pursuant to N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-25 (Michie Supp.
1997), is financed by a surcharge on all qualified health care providers. Id. The excess over
$200,000 per occurrence of any judgment obtained in a medical malpractice action against a
qualified health care provider will be paid by the patient’s compensation fund. N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 41-5-6 (Michie 1996); McCullough, New Mexico, supra. However, the patient’s compensation
fund does not cover a health care provider’s liability for punitive damages. Id. To qualify under the
plan, a health care provider must pay the surcharge and carry liability insurance with limits of
$200,000 per occurrence or deposit an equivalent amount of security with the Superintendent of
Insurance. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-5 (Michie 1996); McCullough, New Mexico, supra; see N.M.
Stat. Ann. § 41-5-6 (Michie 1996).
205. McCullough, New Mexico, supra note 204.
206. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-7 (Michie 1989 & Supp. 1997); McCullough, New Mexico,
supra note 204.
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requires future medical care, the expense of that care must be paid as
incurred.207
GG. New York
New York does not limit the amount of damages recoverable in
medical malpractice actions.208
HH. North Carolina
North Carolina generally does not limit the compensatory damages
recoverable in medical malpractice actions.209 However, for actions
filed on or after January 1, 1996, punitive damages are limited to three
times compensatory damages or $250,000, whichever is greater.210
II. North Dakota
In a wrongful death action or a physical injury action, the trier of
fact may award compensation for economic and non-economic damages,
but the statute does not explicitly limit either award.211 The court may
review awards in excess of $250,000 for reasonableness upon request
from the party responsible for the damages.212 The moving party must
establish that the amount of economic damages awarded did not bear a
reasonable relation to the economic damage incurred.213 If the court
determines that the economic damages awarded were unreasonable, the
court must reduce the award to “reasonable economic damages.”214
For claims arising after April 1, 1995, there is a $500,000 cap on

207. Id.
208. McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of Medical Malpractice Law: New York,
http://www.mcandl.com/ newyork (revised February 6, 1998).
209. McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of Medical Malpractice Law: North Carolina,
http://www.mcandl. com/northcarolina.html (revised February 6, 1998).
210. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-25 (1995); McCullough, North Carolina, supra note 209.
211. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-04 (2003). “Economic damages” refers to “damages arising
from medical expenses, and medical care, rehabilitation services, custodial care, loss of earnings
and earning capacity, loss of income or support, burial costs, cost of substitute domestic services,
loss of employment or business or employment opportunities and other monetary losses.” Id. Noneconomic damages refer to “damages arising from pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical
impairment, disfigurement, mental anguish, emotional distress, fear of injury, loss of society and
companionship, loss of consortium, injury to reputation, humiliation, and other nonpecuniary
damage.” Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
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non-economic damages in medical malpractice cases.215 This applies
regardless of the number of defendants, the number of theories, or the
number of family members who sue.216 Punitive damages are limited to
twice compensatory damages or $250,000.217
JJ. Ohio
In 1997, the Ohio legislature passed a series of civil reform
legislation to place damage caps on non-economic damages, but the
Ohio Supreme Court struck down the legislation as unconstitutional.218
Recently, the Ohio legislature responded by passing a new series of
legislation to place limitations on medical malpractice damages.219 A
medical malpractice claim must be commenced within one year after the
cause of action accrued.220 But if the injury could not have reasonably
been discovered within a four-year window, the person must bring the
action within one year after the person discovered the injury.221 In a
medical malpractice claim, there is no limitation on compensatory
damages that represent economic loss, but there is a $250,000 limitation
on damages that represent non-economic damages.222 In the alternative,
non-economic damages must not exceed an amount “equal to three times
the plaintiff’s economic loss[,] . . . to a maximum of $350,000 for each
plaintiff or a maximum of $500,000 for each occurrence.”223

215. McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of Medical Malpractice Law: North Dakota,
http://www.mcandl.com/ northdakota.html (revised February 6, 1998); see N.D. CENT. CODE § 3262-02 (1996).
216. Id.
217. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-11 (Supp. 1997).
218. See Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 751 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 1999) (holding
the civil justice reform legislation (Am.Sub.H.B. No. 350) unconstitutional on the grounds that it
violated the “one-subject” rule-”no bill shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly
expressed in its title,” and the legislation violated separation of powers by overstepping its
legislative bounds). See also, Morris v. Savoy, 578 N.E.2d 765 (Ohio 1991) (concluding a cap on
general damages was unconstitutional because it “does not bear a real and substantial relation to
public health or welfare and further because it is unreasonable and arbitrary”).
219. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2323.43, 2305.113 (2003).
220. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.113 (2003).
221. Id.
222. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2323.43 (2003).
223. Id. The statute also makes an exception that non-economic damages “shall not exceed
$500,000 for each plaintiff or $1,000,000 for each occurrence if the noneconomic losses of the
plaintiff are for either of the following: (a) Permanent and substantial physical deformity, loss of use
of a limb, or loss of a bodily organ system; (b) Permanent physical functional injury that
permanently prevents the injured person from being able to independently care for self and perform
life sustaining activities.” Id.
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KK. Oklahoma
Oklahoma limits punitive damages in medical malpractice cases.224
In cases of reckless disregard of the rights of others, punitive damages
are limited to $100,000.225 In cases of intentional and malicious acts,
punitive damages are limited to the greater of $500,000, twice
compensatory damages, or the benefit derived by defendant from his
conduct.226 If the jury finds by clear and convincing evidence that the
defendant acted intentionally and with malice toward others or the court
finds that there is evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
acted intentionally with malice and threatened human life, the cap does
not apply.227 The court will reduce punitive damages if it finds that the
defendant has already paid punitive damages in Oklahoma for the same
misconduct.228
LL. Oregon
The Oregon legislature established a $500,000 damage cap for noneconomic damages in all civil actions arising out of bodily injury, death,
or property damage.229 The Oregon Supreme Court, however, found the
non-economic damage cap to be unconstitutional because it violated a
victim’s right to a trial by jury.230
Punitive damages cannot be awarded against a health care
practitioner, but the provision does not apply to hospitals or health care
providers.231 In an action where punitive damages are awarded, 40
percent of the punitive damages are paid to the prevailing party, of

224. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9.1 (West 2003).
225. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9.1 (West 2003); McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary
of Medical Malpractice Law: Oklahoma, http://www.mcandl.com/oklahoma.html (revised February
6, 1998).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. OR. REV. STAT. § 18.560 (2001). The statute specifies that it does not apply to punitive
damages. Id.
230. See Lakin v. Senco Prod., Inc., 987 P.2d 463 (Or. 1999) (concluding that the noneconomic
damage cap is unconstitutional because when a jury awards a verdict greater than the $500,000
limit, the statute “prevents the jury from having its full and intended effect”). Therefore, “to permit
the legislature to override the effect of the jury’s determination of noneconomic damages would
‘violate’ plaintiffs’ right to ‘Trial by Jury’.” Id. The Oregon Supreme Court made it clear,
however, that it did not overrule Greist v. Phillips, 906 P.2d 789 (Or. 1995), which held that there
was no right to trial by jury in a wrongful death action because a wrongful death claim was not
recognized at common law, but was rather created by statute. Id. at 77.
231. OR. REV. STAT. § 18.550 (2001).
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which not more than 20 percent may be paid for attorneys’ fees.232 The
remaining 60 percent must be paid to the Criminal Injuries
Compensation Account.233 The Oregon Supreme Court has held the
punitive damages statute to be constitutional.234 Punitive damages can
only be awarded in a civil action if it can be proven by clear and
convincing evidence that the party acted with malice or a “reckless . . .
indifference to a highly unreasonable risk.”235
MM. Pennsylvania
While Pennsylvania does not impose a cap on compensatory
damages it is
one of the states most seriously affected by the medical malpractice
liability insurance crisis, continues to grapple with the problem. The
Pennsylvania Department of Insurance released a new study showing
that medical malpractice insurers lost $18 million in their operations in
the state last year. The analysis shows that even after accounting for
reserves, malpractice insurance underwriters in Pennsylvania incurred
losses in 2002 for the fourth consecutive year. The state authorities
said that the malpractice underwriters earned $46.4 million in
investment income last year while paying out $345.9 million in claims,
$136.9 million in legal costs and $81.1 million for taxes and other
operating expenses. In response, Governor Ed Rendell has proposed
state subsidies of $200 million to help doctors pay for insurance over
the next three years. Doctors in the state buy the first $500,000.00 of
coverage from private insurers and the second $500,000.00 from the
state’s catastrophic insurance MCARE Fund.236

Effective January 25, 1997, punitive damages against individual
physicians shall not exceed 200 percent of compensatory damages,
except in cases of intentional misconduct.237 Under current law, 25
percent of punitive damages in medical malpractice cases must be paid

232. OR. REV. STAT. § 18.540 (2001).
233. Id.
234. See DeMendoza v. Huffman, 51 P.3d 1232 (Or. 2002) (holding that §18.540 does not
violate the Oregon Constitution).
235. OR. REV. STAT. § 18.537 (2001).
236. Ins. Info. Inst., supra note 174.
237. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1303.505(d) (LEXIS 2003); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 40 § 1301.812A(g) (LEXIS archives) (repealed 2002); McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of Medical
Malpractice Law: Pennsylvania, http://www. mcandl.com/pennsylvania.html (revised May 30,
2003). Punitive damages, when awarded, shall not be less than $100,000, unless a lower verdict
amount is returned by the trier of fact. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1303.505(d) (LEXIS 2003).
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into a special, state sponsored Fund rather than to the prevailing party.238
NN. Rhode Island
Rhode Island does not permit punitive damages in any action
brought by or against the executor or administrator of an estate.239 There
is a $250,000 minimum recovery in any wrongful death action.240
OO. South Carolina
South Carolina does not impose a cap on the amount of damages
that a claimant can recover in a medical malpractice case.241
PP. South Dakota
In any action for damages for personal injury or death in a medical
malpractice action in South Dakota, the total general damages may not
exceed $500,000.242 This section formerly provided for a cap of
$1,000,000 on all damages, whether economic or non-economic.243 The
cap on all damages, however, was found to violate the state
constitution.244 The court also held that the cap applied separately to the
238. Id.; see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1303.505(e) (LEXIS 2003).
239. R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-8 (1997); McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of Medical
Malpractice Law: Rhode Island, http://www.mcandl.com/rhodeisland.html (revised February 6,
1998).
240. R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-7-2 (1997).
241. McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of Medical Malpractice Law: South Carolina,
http://www.mcandl. com/southcarolina.html (revised February 6, 1998). However, South Carolina
has established a Patients’ Compensation Fund to benefit licensed health care providers. Id. The
Fund is responsible for the payment of that portion of any medical malpractice or general liability
judgment or settlement which exceeds $100,000 per incident and $300,000 in the annual aggregate.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-79-420 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997). All health care providers can participate
in the Fund. S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-79-440 (Law. Co-op. 1989). As members, the health care
provider must pay an annual fee. S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-79-450 (Law. Co-op. 1989). Upon being
served with a complaint, the health care provider must notify the Fund’s Board of Governors of the
action. S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-79-480 (Law. Co-op. 1989). If the board determines that the damage
amounts may exceed $200,000, the Fund can appear and actively defend the Fund. Id. The insurer
providing liability insurance to the health care provider must provide an adequate defense so as to
prevent impairment of the Fund. Id. Settlements that exceed $200,000 must be approved by the
Board of Governors. Id.
242. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-3-11 (Michie Supp. 1997); McCullough, Campbell & Lane,
Summary of Medical Malpractice Law: South Dakota, http://www.mcandl.com/southdakota.html
(revised May 23, 1998). Damages awarded for non-economic injury such as pain and suffering. Id.
243. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-3-11 (Michie Supp. 1986).
244. Knowles v. United States, 544 N.W.2d 183 (S.D. 1996). The Knowles decision
automatically revived the form of the act as it existed prior to being amended in 1985, at which time
it provided for a $500,000 cap on general damages. Id.
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personal injury claim of the infant plaintiff and to his parents’ claim for
medical expenses and loss of services.245
QQ. Tennessee
Tennessee does not place a cap on the amount of damages
recoverable in a medical malpractice action.246
RR. Texas
In September 2003, the Texas legislature replaced its former
damage cap provisions with a new set of medical malpractice
provisions.247 In a medical malpractice claim involving a physician or
health care provider, other than a health care institution, non-economic
damages are limited to $250,000.248 In a medical malpractice action
against one health care institution, non-economic damages are likewise
limited to $250,000.249 If a final judgment is rendered against more than
one health care institution, non-economic damages are limited to
$250,000 for each health care institution, but not to exceed $500,000
inclusive of all health care institutions involved.250
In a wrongful death action based on medical malpractice, noneconomic damages are limited to $500,000 regardless of the number of
physicians, health care providers, or separate causes of action.251 This
limit will be adjusted according to an increase or decrease in the
245. Id.
246. McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of Medical Malpractice Law: Tennessee,
http://www.mcandl.com/ tennessee (revised February 6, 1998).
247. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 74.301, 74.302, 74.303 (2004). These statutes
replaced former TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, §§ 11.02 and 11.03. See also, Rose v.
Doctors Hospital, 801 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. 1990) (concluding that since a wrongful death claim is
based on statutory law and not common law, the “open court” provision does not bar the Medical
Liability Act’s damage cap provisions). In Upton County v. Brown, 960 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. App.
1997), the court noted that Rose was superseded by the Texas legislature in §§ 71.002, 71.021 to
the extent that Rose concluded at common law, a personal injury claim expired at the claimant’s
death and the decedent’s survivors did not have a cause of action. Id. at 815. See also, Lucas v.
United States, 757 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 1988) (holding that the former damage cap provisions were
only unconstitutional when applied to common-law claims); Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. v.
Auld, 34 S.W.3d 887 (Tex. 2000) (limiting the Lucas holding to apply only to common-law claims);
Detar Hospital, Inc. v. Estrada, 694 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. App. 1985) (holding former Texas statute
§4590i unconstitutional because the statutes absolute limitation on damages “is an unreasonable
infringement on a plaintiff’s constitutionally guaranteed right to obtaining full redress for injuries
caused by another’s wrongful conduct”).
248. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN 74.301 (2004).
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.303 (2004).
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consumer price index.252
The Texas legislature has also placed a cap on punitive damages
that are to be considered separately from other compensatory
damages.253 Punitive damages are limited not to exceed two times the
amount of economic damages plus an amount equal to any noneconomic damages found by the jury, however, not to exceed
$750,000.254 The punitive damage limitation does not apply to certain
felonies.255
Prior to 2003, Texas limited damages in a medical malpractice
action for wrongful death to $500,000, in 1977 dollars.256 This amount
was adjusted annually for inflation.257 As of 2002, it was valued at
approximately $1,300,000.258 The statute was intended to apply to all
medical malpractice cases, but has been held to be unconstitutional
except with respect to wrongful death.259
Moreover, before 2003, Texas law limited punitive damages in
cases arising after September 1, 1995, to two times the amount of
economic damages, plus an amount equal to non-economic damages
found by the jury, not to exceed $750,000, or $200,000, whichever is
greater.260 This was formerly four times actual damages or $200,000,
whichever is greater.261 The cap on punitive damages does not apply in
cases of certain felonies, including fraudulent destruction or
concealment of written records.262
SS. Utah
Utah limits damages recoverable for non-economic loss, to
compensate for pain, suffering, and inconvenience.263 In an action
arising before July 1, 2001, non-economic damages may not exceed
252. Id.
253. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.008 (2004).
254. Id. If there are not non-economic damages found, punitive damages must not exceed
$250,000. Id.
255. Id.
256. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 11.02 (West Supp. 1998); McCullough,
Campbell
&
Lane,
Summary
of
Medical
Malpractice
Law:
Texas,
http://www.mcandl.com/texas.html (revised August 13, 1999).
257. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 11.04 (West Supp. 1998).
258. McCullough, Texas, supra note 256.
259. Rose v. Doctors Hosp., 801 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. 1990); McCullough, Texas, supra note 256.
260. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.008 (West 1997).
261. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.007 (West 1991) (repealed 1995).
262. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.008 (West 1997).
263. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-7.1 (2001); McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of
Medical Malpractice Law: Utah, http://www.mcandl.com/utah.html (revised May 21, 1999).
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$250,000.264 For an action arising on or after July 1, 2001 and before
July 1, 2002, the limit is adjusted for inflation to $400,000.265
TT. Vermont
Vermont does not place a cap on the amount of damages a claimant
may recover in a medical malpractice action.266
UU. Virginia
Virginia places a maximum recovery limit on all damages in
medical malpractice cases.267 For claims arising out of acts or omissions
prior to August 1, 1999, the total amount recoverable for any injury to,
or death of, a patient shall not exceed the limitation on recovery set forth
in the statute as it was in effect when the act or acts of malpractice
occurred.268 For acts or omissions on or after August 1, 1999, and
before July 1, 2000, the cap is $1.5 million.269 The statute provides that
the cap is increased by $50,000 every July 1.270 Two final increases of
$75,000 beginning in 2007 will bring the damage cap to $2 million for
acts or omissions on or after July 1, 2008.271 The Virginia Supreme
Court has twice considered this legislation and held that it does not
violate the U.S. or Virginia constitutions.272 A settlement with one
defendant reduces the maximum liability of the others, as the cap limits
the total amount recoverable for an injury to a patient, regardless of the
number of theories or defendants.273 This includes punitive damages.274
In cases arising prior to March 28, 1994, when the definition of “health
care provider” was broadened, a physician’s professional corporation
may be subject to uncapped liability.275
264. Id.
265. Id. Beginning July 1, 2002, and each July 1 thereafter, the limit for damages shall be
adjusted for inflation by the state treasurer. Id.
266. McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of Medical Malpractice Law: Vermont,
http:www.mcandl.com/ vermont.html (revised February 6, 1998).
267. VA. CODE ANN. §8.01-581.15 (2003); McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of
Medical Malpractice Law: Virginia, http://www.mcandl.com/virginia (revised June 2, 2003).
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Pulliam v. Coastal Emergency Serv., Inc., 509 S.E.2d 307 (Va. 1999); Etheridge v. Med.
Ctr. Hosp., 376 S.E.2d 525 (Va. 1989); McCullough, Virginia, supra note 267.
273. Fairfax Hosp. Sys. v. Nevitt, 457 S.E.2d 10 (Va. 1995).
274. Bulala v. Boyd, 389 S.E.2d 670 (Va. 1990).
275. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.1 (LEXIS 2003); Schwartz v. Brownlee, 482 S.E.2d 827 (Va.
1997).
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Virginia limits punitive damages to $350,000.276 This cap has also
been found constitutional.277
VV. Washington
Washington limited non-economic damages for personal injury or
death to an amount determined by multiplying 0.43 by the average
annual wage and by the life expectancy of the person incurring the noneconomic damages.278 However, the Supreme Court of Washington has
held that this cap on non-economic damages is an unconstitutional
infringement of the right to trial by jury.279
WW. West Virginia
Prior to 2003, West Virginia juries were instructed that the
maximum they could award against a health care provider for noneconomic loss was $1,000,000.280 While this statute was held to be
constitutional,281 in March 2003:
West Virginia Governor Bob Wise signed into law a bill that caps
medical malpractice pain and suffering awards at $250,000.00, except
in cases of wrongful death or bodily impairment, when the cap is
$500,000.00. Another provision in the bill calls for a doctor-owned and
managed physicians’ mutual insurance company to be up and running
no later than July 1, 2004.282

XX. Wisconsin
The Wisconsin legislature has established a non-economic damage
cap in medical malpractice actions of $350,000 to be adjusted to reflect
changes in the consumer price index.283 The Wisconsin Court of
276. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (LEXIS 2003).
277. McCullough, Virginia, supra note 267; see Wackenhut Applied Tech. Ctr., Inc. v.
Sygnetron Prot. Sys., Inc., 979 F.2d 980 (4th Cir. 1992).
278. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.56.250 (West 1988).
279. Sofie v. Fireboard Corp., 771 P.2d 711 (Wash. 1989); McCullough, Campbell & Lane,
Summary of Medical Malpractice Law: Washington, http://www.mcandl.com/washington.html
(revised February 6, 1998).
280. W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-8 (1994); McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of Medical
Malpractice Law: West Virginia, http://www.mcandl.com/westvirgina.html (revised February 6,
1998).
281. Robinson v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 414 S.E.2d 877 (W. Va. 1991).
282. Ins. Info. Inst., supra note 174.
283. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.55. The statute also places a statute of limitations for a medical
malpractice claim of three years from the date of the injury or one year from the date the injury was
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Appeals has held the medical malpractice non-economic damage cap to
be constitutional.284
Damages for wrongful death are limited by a separate wrongful
death statute, even when the wrongful death was caused by medical
malpractice.285 The Wisconsin wrongful death statute was amended for
cases after April 28, 1998 to increase the damage cap to $500,000 for the
death of a minor and $350,000 for the death of an adult.286
YY. Wyoming
The Wyoming Constitution provides, “[n]o law shall be enacted
limiting the amount of damages to be recovered for causing the injury or
death of any person.”287 Thus, Wyoming does not limit the amount of
damages one may recover in a medical malpractice action.288
V. THE FAILURE OF CAPS IN CALIFORNIA: A CASE STUDY
As noted above, California enacted a medical malpractice cap law,
entitled “The Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act” (MICRA), in
1975. MICRA:
(1) placed a $250,000.00 cap on the amount of compensation paid to
malpractice victims for their non-economic injuries; (2) eliminated the
collateral source rule that forces those found liable for malpractice to
pay all the expenses incurred by the victim; (3) permitted those found
liable for malpractice to pay the compensation they owe victims on an
installment plan basis; (4) imposed a short statute of limitations on
malpractice victims (generally, three years); (5) established a sliding
discovered. Id.
284. See Guzman v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 623 N.W.2d 776 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000) (holding the
non-economic damage cap unconstitutional because “there is a rational relationship between the
prospective application of the cap on the recovery of noneconomic damages (affecting all plaintiffs
from the effective date of the cap forward) and the legislature’s goal of preserving health-care
services in Wisconsin”). In Martin v. Richardson, 531 N.W.2d 70 (Wis. 1995), the Wisconsin
Supreme Court held that a previous non-economic damage cap was unconstitutional because its
retroactive application would result in minimal reduced payouts to plaintiffs. Id. at 588.
285. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.55. Furthermore, “[i]f damages in excess of the limit under §
895.04 are found, the court shall make any reduction required under § 895.045 and shall reward the
lesser of the reduced amount or the limit under §895.04.” Id.
286. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.04. When a jury awards damages that are in excess of the damage
cap, the court shall reduce the award to the maximum amount. Id. See also, 1997 WIS. ACT 89.;
Neiman v. Am. Nat’l Prop. & Cas. Co., 613 N.W.2d 160 (Wis. 2000) (holding the retroactive
damage increase provision of §895.04 was unconstitutional).
287. WYO. CONST. art. 10, § 4; McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of Medical
Malpractice Law: Wyoming, http://www.mcandl.com/wyoming (revised February 6, 1998).
288. Id.
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scale for attorneys’ fees that discouraged lawyers from accepting
serious or complicated medical malpractice cases.289

Following MICRA’s enactment, malpractice liability insurance
premiums continued to rise. “By 1988, twelve years after the passage of
MICRA, California medical malpractice premiums had reached an alltime high – 450% higher than 1975, when MICRA was enacted.”290 In
fact, “[d]uring the mid 1980’s, California malpractice premiums
increased by more than 20% annually.”291
While insurers maintained that the increase was due to court
challenges to MICRA, following the California Supreme Court’s
decision to validate the damage cap in 1985: “malpractice premiums
increased more dramatically in 1986 than any year since the passage of
MICRA. Between 1985, when the cap was upheld, and 1988,
malpractice premiums soared 47%.”292
Facing yet another crisis in its health care system, California
enacted California Insurance Code § 1861.01, commonly known as
Proposition 103.
Proposition 103 “explicitly required insurance
premium rollbacks of up to 20%.”293 “[M]edical malpractice rates in
California began to fall immediately after the passage of Proposition
103, and within three years . . . total medical malpractice premiums had
dropped by 20.2% from the 1988 high. After adjusting for inflation, the
premium drop . . . actually [amounted to] 30.7%.”294
With Proposition 103 firmly in place, medical malpractice liability
premiums initially fell, and then stabilized.295 Since the inception of
Proposition 103, the annual variations in medical malpractice premiums
in California have been “significantly less drastic and, as a result of the
regulatory process, [became] far more predictable under the regulated
system than ever before.”296
Based upon the foregoing data, one may reasonably conclude that
the stability achieved in medical malpractice insurance premiums in the
state of California since 1988 is attributable to the regulation of
insurance rates, and not to caps on non-economic damage awards.
289. The Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights, How Insurance Reform Lowered
Doctors’ Medical Malpractice Rates in California: and How Malpractice Caps Failed,
www.consumerwatchdog.com (March 7, 2003) [hereinafter FTCR].
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
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VI. THE WEISS STUDY: CAPS DO NOT RESULT IN A REDUCTION OF
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE PREMIUMS
While caps on medical malpractice insurers do reduce the burden
on such insurers, statistically, caps do not lead to a reduction in medical
malpractice insurance premiums.297
On June 2, 2003, Weiss Ratings Inc., a private ratings agency, and
one of the nation’s top five raters of life/health insurers, 298 released the
results of a study entitled, “The Impact of Non-Economic Damage Caps
on Physician Premiums, Claims Payout Levels, and Availability of
Coverage.” The study relied upon data provided by the National
Practitioner Data Bank, and it “compared the median payouts in the 19
states with caps to those in the 32 states without caps for the period
between 1991 and 2002.”299
Weiss found:

297. Weiss Ratings, supra note 2.
298. United States General Accounting Office, Comparison of Private Agency Ratings for
Life/Health Insurers, http://www.weissratings.com/gao _study.asp (September 1994). At the
request of the Rep. Cardiss Collins, Chairwoman of the House Subcommittee on Commerce, the
U.S. General Accounting Office undertook a comparison of the rating systems of the five major
raters of life/health insurers – A.M. Best (Best), Duff & Phelps (D&P), Moody’s, Standard and
Poor’s (S&P) and Weiss Research (Weiss) over the period August 31, 1989, to June 30, 1992, to
determine which raters were first to report the vulnerability of financially impaired or insolvent
insurers. Id. According to the GAO:
United States Government Insurer ratings could not be easily compared across the five
rating agencies because they did not all use the same approach and methods to rate
insurer financial health. Rating scales and descriptions of ratings varied by agency and
over time. Weiss placed far less reliance than the other agencies on analysts’ judgment.
Coverage differed – Weiss was the only agency to rate more than half of all insurers.
Finally, Weiss and Moody’s were less likely than the other agencies to assign insurers
their top ratings.
Best and Weiss provided the most comprehensive coverage of life/health insurers;
between them, they rated the majority of financially impaired life/health insurers. Weiss’
ratings reflected financial vulnerability first three times more often than Best in the cases
we compared. On average, Weiss’ ratings reflected financial vulnerability 8 months
earlier than Best. The other agencies – D&P, Moody’s and S&P – rated, at most, five of
the life/health insurers that became financially impaired during our comparison period.
These five, among the six largest such insurers, were also rated by Best and Weiss.
Weiss was the first to assign a vulnerable rating in five of the six cases; Moody’s –
which rated only two of the six insurers—was first in the sixth case. In no case was Best,
S&P, or D&P first to reflect financial vulnerability for these six insurers. In four of these
cases, Best did not assign a vulnerable rating until after the first public regulatory action.
Our results are not projectible and apply only to the time period of less than 3 years that
the data cover.
Id.
299. Weiss Ratings, supra note 2.
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Payouts reduced. In states without caps, the median payout for the
entire 12-year period was $116,297.00, ranging from $75,000.00 on
the low end to $220,000.00 on the high end. In states with caps, the
median was 15.7% lower, or $98,079.00, ranging from $50,000.00 to
$190,000.00. Since caps in many states were not imposed until late in
the 12-year period, this represents a significant reduction.
Growth in payouts slowed substantially. The median payout in the 32
states without caps increased by 127.9%, from $65,831.00 in 1991 to
$150,000.00 in 2002. In contrast, payouts in the 19 states with caps
increased at a far slower pace by 83.3%, from $60,000.00 in 1991 to
$110,000.00 in 2002.300

Weiss interpreted this data to mean that “caps do accomplish their
intended purpose of lowering the average amount insurance companies
must pay out to satisfy medical malpractice claims.”301
However, it was found that despite lowering the insurers’ payout
obligations, “insurers continue to increase premiums at a rapid pace,
regardless of caps.”302
This conclusion was drawn by Weiss “using 1991 to 2002 data
published by the Medical Liability Monitor.”303 More specifically,
Weiss examined “the median medical malpractice premiums paid by
doctors in three high-risk specialties—internal medicine, general
surgery, and obstetrics/gynecology.”304 In so doing, Weiss found:
1. States with caps had sharper increases in median annual premiums.
Since the insurers in the states with caps reaped the benefit of lower
med mal payouts, one would expect that they’d reduce the premiums
they charged doctors. At the very minimum, they should have been
able to slow down the rate of premium increases. Surprisingly, the data
show they did precisely the opposite:
•

In the 19 states with caps, the median annual premium
increased by 48.2%, from $20,414 in 1991 to $30,246 in
2002.

•

In the 32 states without caps, the median annual premium
actually increased at a slower pace—by 35.9%, from $22,118
in 1991 to $30,056 in 2002.

Thus, on average, doctors in states with caps actually suffered a
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
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significantly larger increase than doctors in states without caps.
2. A smaller proportion of states with caps were able to contain
premium increases. In some states, the median annual premiums
remained flat or even declined at various times during the period. Was
this related to the imposition of caps? In the overwhelming majority of
states, the answer is clearly “no.” Indeed. . .
•

Among the 19 with caps, only two states, or 10.5%,
experienced flat or declining med mal premiums following
the imposition of caps.

•

Meanwhile, among the 32 without caps, the record was
actually much better: Six states, or 18.7%, experienced flat or
declining premiums.

3. Premiums in states with caps are more likely to exceed national
median. Focusing on the most recent data, we find that:
•

In 47.4% of the states with caps (9 out of 19), 2002 median
premiums were below the national median premium of
$30,093.

•

Meanwhile, in 50% of the states without caps (16 out of 32),
2002 median premiums were below the national median.

In short, the results clearly invalidate the expectations of cap
proponents. To review the surprising facts:
•

Insurers in states with caps raised their premiums at a
significantly faster pace than those in states without caps.

•

Even with the imposition of caps, insurers in nearly nine out
of ten states continued to raise rates, while insurers in states
without caps were actually more likely to hold or cut their
premium rates.

•

In states with caps, insurers are more likely to charge med mal
premiums exceeding the national median than those in states
without caps.

Based upon the above findings, Weiss concluded that such
“counter-intuitive”305 results “can lead to only one conclusion: there are
other, far more important factors driving the rise in medical malpractice
premiums than caps or medical malpractice payouts.”306

305. Weiss Ratings, supra note 2.
306. Id.
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VII. OTHER FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE ESCALATION OF
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE PREMIUMS
According to the Weiss study, six factors are significant in driving
up medical malpractice insurance premiums, “each of which may be
exerting a greater impact on premiums than the presence or absence of
caps.”307 These factors include:
(1) medical cost inflation; (2) the cyclical nature of the insurance
market; (3) the need to shore up reserves for policies in force; (4) a
decline in investment income; (5) overall financial safety
considerations; and (6) the supply and demand of coverage.308

As to medical cost inflation, Weiss noted that the inflation rate in
the 12-year period studied was 75 percent.309 “However, throughout the
country, insurers had a general tendency to let their premium increases
lag behind the pace of medical inflation. This was most likely due to the
extended soft market experienced by the entire property and casualty
insurance industry in the 1990’s, explained below.”310
Next, with respect to the cyclical nature of the insurance market,
Weiss maintained that such market
is historically and fundamentally cyclical, with periods of rising
premium rates followed by periods of steady or declining premiums. In
the declining portion of the cycle—”a soft market”—insurers relax
their underwriting standards and underprice their products in order to
retain or gain market share.
The most recent soft market lasted longer than usual—12 years, from
1987 to 1999—probably because of the raging bull market in stocks.
Insurers made so much money in their investments they were able to
aggressively underprice their policies, deliberately lose money in their
underwriting, and still turn a profit overall. As a result, losses in their
core operations, more than offset by surging gains from the stock
market boom, were largely overlooked by the industry and regulators
alike.
All that changed when the stock market boom turned to bust. Property
and casualty insurers had to confront the ramifications of their loose
underwriting practices: not enough money in premiums collected to
cover anticipated claims. That’s when they began to seriously tighten

307.
308.
309.
310.
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underwriting standards and raise premium rates.311

Concerning the need for insurers to shore up reserves for policies in
force, Weiss noted:
When insurers write a new policy, they look at past claims experience,
make some actuarial assumptions, and place a portion of that policy’s
premium into a reserve to cover expected future claims. A prudent
insurer will make conservative assumptions and err on the side of
having more in reserve than it ultimately needs to pay claims. At the
end of each year, the insurer then evaluates its reserves for each block
of business and determines if a change is warranted to either add or
subtract reserves.
Data reported to the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
(NAIC) show that med mal insurers have been consistently underreserving since 1997—to the tune of $4.6 billion through December
31, 2001. The under-reserving came to a head in 1999, at the tail end
of the soft market. That’s when loose underwriting practices caught up
with the insurers, as claims rose to a higher level than expected. Thus,
even before the bull market ended in the stock market, insurers were
coming under increasing pressure to boost their reserves to make up
for past shortfalls.
There’s only one place these funds could come from—the company’s
capital; and there was only one way the company could maintain or
build its capital—by making more profits. Thus, premium increases
were inevitable.312

With respect to the decline in insurers’ investment income, Weiss
found:
Until 2000, most of the additional profits insurers needed could be
covered by rising investment income and gains from the booming
stock market. But during the three-year bear market from 2000 to
2002, as large stock market gains turned to even larger stock market
losses, insurers were confronted with double trouble:
(1) After just one year of premium increases, they still had barely
begun to restore their reserves. (2) Now, aggravating their
difficulties, they also needed to compensate for stock market
losses. With falling stock prices and declining interest rates,
investment income7 for the entire property/casualty industry fell
23% in 2001 compared to 2000, and then another 2.5% in 2002;
and we must assume that med mal insurers suffered a similar
311. Weiss Ratings, supra note 2.
312. Id.
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decline. Indeed, investment income is particularly critical for lines
of business like med mal where the duration of claims payouts
typically span several years.313
Thus, it was the combination of two powerful forces—under-reserving
throughout most of the 1990s plus the rapid fall in investment income
in the 2000s—that largely drove the unusually rapid premium
increases, not only in med mal, but in many other property and
casualty lines as well.314

Addressing the issue of insurers’ financial safety, Weiss opined:
“[I]f insurers do not replace capital that has been used to shore up
reserves, the financial strength of the company deteriorates, ultimately
leading to the possibility of financial failure.”315
Finally, turning to the supply and demand of coverage, the Weiss
study found that:
Press reports have highlighted the plight of physicians around the
country who are closing up shop because their med mal insurer is
pulling out of the local market.
To help determine if this is an industry-wide problem, for each year
between 1991 and 2002, we counted the number of insurers that are
writing new med mal policies and/or renewing existing policies.
The number of carriers providing med mal coverage nationwide
increased from 244 in 1991 to a peak of 274 in 1997. Since 1997,
however, the number of carriers declined steadily to a low of 241 in
2001, recovering slightly to 247 in 2002.
Compared to 1991, therefore, there has actually been a modest
increase in the number of med mal carriers—from 244 to 247.
However, doctors are currently feeling the pressures of diminished
supply reflected in the declining trend since 1997. Moreover, in certain
regions and in certain medical specialties, there is abundant anecdotal
evidence that certain med mal insurers have pulled out or discontinued
coverage.316

313.
314.
315.
316.
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VIII. ALTERNATIVES TO CAPS
If caps are ineffective in driving down medical malpractice liability
premiums, then what can be done to solve the current crisis in health
care? The Weiss study lays out a five step approach that targets the root
causes leading to the dramatic escalation of medical malpractice liability
insurance premiums:
1. Legislators must immediately put on hold all proposals involving
non-economic damage caps until convincing evidence can be
produced to demonstrate a true benefit to doctors in the form of
reduced med mal costs. Right now, consumers are being asked to
sacrifice not only large damage claims, but also critical leverage to
help regulate the medical profession—all with the stated goal that it
will end the med mal crisis for doctors. However, the data indicate
that, similar state legislation has merely produced the worst of both
worlds: The sacrifice by consumers plus a continuing —and even
worsening—crisis for doctors. Neither party derived any benefit
whatsoever from the caps.
2. Regulators must review and revise their parameters for approving
rate increases. The big lesson to be learned from the past decade is
that it’s dangerous to count on volatile investments—especially
common stocks—to compensate for poor operations.
....
3. Insurance companies must never again allow marketing to divert or
pervert prudent actuarial analysis and planning. Consumers and
medical professionals can accept rate increases provided they are
spread out evenly over time, and provided they are given good
value for their premium dollars in terms of claims paying ability
and stability. They cannot accept rate increases that are designed to
cover up, or compensate for, serious mismanagement.
4. The medical profession must assume more responsibility for
policing itself, while states must be more pro-active in reviewing
the licenses of individual practitioners who have a significantly
higher-than-average number of claims against them in their
specialty, in proportion to their level of activity. These individuals
greatly increase the risk associated with their specialties, pushing
med mal premiums up for all doctors in that sector. States must also
make major strides to share data on high-risk doctors. At the very
minimum, they must cease licensing doctors who have lost their
licenses in other states, often due to high-cost medical mistakes.
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5. Consumers must not relinquish their right to sue for non-economic
damages until the medical profession and/or state and federal
governments provide more adequate supervision and regulation of
doctors, hospitals, and other health care providers.317

In sum, the Weiss study concludes that caps “will not make a
significant dent in the problem, and may even have adverse impacts. It is
no substitute for longer-term, fundamental solutions that address the
actual factors behind the medical malpractice crisis.”318
IX. CONCLUSION
It is undeniable that caps on non-economic damage awards have
resulted in lower claim payouts for insurers. However, as California’s
MICRA experiment and the GAO and Weiss studies have demonstrated,
this has not translated into a reduction in medical malpractice premiums
for physicians. The failure of caps to effectively drive down the cost of
medical malpractice liability insurance is directly related to the fact that
caps merely address one of several factors that have caused the dramatic
escalation of medical malpractice liability insurance rates over the past
decade.
In short, “broad market forces prevailing in the property/casualty
industry have driven — and continue to drive — medical malpractice
premiums up, evidently overwhelming any reduction in jury awards.”319
Thus, “by focusing on caps as a solution:”320
[T]he insurance companies and their supporters are diverting the
public’s attention away from long years of mismanagement by an
industry that continually allowed actuarial prudence to take a back seat
to marketing strategy.
The insurers, insurance regulators and insurance legislators are
avoiding a much-needed post-mortem on what really went wrong in
the property and casualty industry in general and in the med mal sector
in particular.321

At this juncture, what is needed is less hysteria, and more of a focus
on what is driving the current crisis in health care. Until legislators and
the special interests they represent recognize that greater reform,
regulation and policing is warranted in both the medical and insurance
317.
318.
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320.
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industries, the current epidemic will continue to fester.
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